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TAX LAW’S WORKPLACE SHIFT 
SHU-YI OEI & DIANE M. RING 
ABSTRACT 
In December 2017, Congress passed major tax reform. The reform included 
an important new provision that granted independent contractors and other 
pass-through taxpayers—but not employees or corporations—a potential tax 
deduction equal to 20% of their qualified business income. Critics have argued 
that this new deduction (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 199A) could lead to a 
widespread shift toward independent contractor jobs as workers seek to reduce 
taxes paid. This shift could cause workers to lose important employee 
protections and leave them more economically vulnerable.  
This Article examines whether this new tax provision will create a large-scale 
workplace shift and, if it does, how that shift should be normatively evaluated. 
It argues that while tax law in general has important and underappreciated 
effects on work arrangements, it is difficult to isolate § 199A as the driver of a 
broad workplace shift. Several other nontax legal changes and nonlegal 
economic developments are transforming work arrangements and classification 
choices; § 199A is only one factor. Moreover, § 199A is not the only tax law 
change that is likely to impact classification choices.  
Drawing on empirical data on contemporary workplace trends, this Article 
also argues that even if new § 199A induces a workplace shift, how this shift is 
evaluated must depend on the types of workers and the work at issue. While an 
independent contractor shift may increase precariousness for some workers, 
empirical data suggests that for others a shift may be less troubling or troubling 
for different reasons. This Article lays a framework for analyzing how tax law 
contributes to and interacts with other factors in ultimately shaping 
contemporary work arrangements.  
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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2017, Congress passed the most significant tax reform since the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.1 One of the most important new provisions is 
§ 199A, which grants independent contractors, partners, and other pass-through 
taxpayers—but not employees or corporate taxpayers—a deduction equal to 
20% of their qualified business income (“QBI”).2 The deduction could be a 
significant boon to those eligible and is likely to affect tens of millions of 
American individuals and businesses.3 Thus, in the aftermath of the provision’s 
passage, vigorous debate erupted over the effects of and problems with this new 
Code provision. 
A key theme that has emerged in the years since the 2017 tax reform’s passage 
is concern over the potential effect of § 199A on work and labor. This concern 
has manifested itself in a specific critique that is symptomatic of a more 
generalized worry. The specific critique that commentators have advanced is 
that the new deduction creates a strong incentive for individuals to give up 
employee status and its accompanying benefits in order to become independent 
contractors and thus become eligible to claim the deduction.4 This shift, if it 
occurs, could signal a dramatic transformation of the American workplace. A 
worker’s status as employee or as independent contractor has implications that 
extend far beyond tax law into minimum-wage, collective-bargaining, 
workplace-benefits, health-and-safety, and antidiscrimination law.5 Widespread 
 
1 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. §§ 1-7702 (2018)). 
2 I.R.C. § 199A. 
3 Martin A. Sullivan, The Market for Passthrough Deduction Tax Advice, 160 TAX NOTES 
165, 165 (2018) (estimating that 17.2 million small-business taxpayers will generate § 199A 
deductions of less than $1000, 4.8 million will generate deductions exceeding $1000, and 3.3 
million will generate deductions of unknown amounts). 
4 See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and 
Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1459-64 (2019) (outlining 
how new rules create “tremendous incentives for taxpayers to attempt to shoehorn their 
income into the ‘qualified’ category” and harms that may accompany such attempts); Daniel 
Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 49, 63-64 (“The 
pass-through rules create a tax incentive to be a ‘business owner’ rather than an employee. 
This may simply involve formal restructuring, such as by calling oneself an independent 
contractor, rather than an employee . . . .”); Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Opinion, 
Republican Tax ‘Reform’ Creates One of the Largest New Loopholes in Decades; the 20% 
Deduction for ‘Pass-Through Income’ Will Make Many of the Richest Americans Richer, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2017, at A18; Andrew Khouri, Contract Workers Get Tax Cut Under New 
Law; Earners in the Gig Economy Can Deduct 20% of Their Income, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2018, at C1 (discussing how new § 199A benefits independent contractors). 
5 See generally, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An 
Empirical Analysis, 101 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2017) (examining implications of worker 
misclassification for antidiscrimination statutes); V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: 
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reclassification of workers as independent contractors or large-scale 
abandonment of traditional jobs in favor of self-employment could significantly 
decrease worker eligibility for these protections, increasing the precariousness 
of work. 
The more generalized worry underpinning the specific critique is that work 
itself and the security it offers are changing, and that tax law may be accelerating 
that transformation. New § 199A is one example of a tax provision that could 
make precarious work relationships more pervasive and lead to a decline in 
worker security. But the generalized worry about tax law’s effects extends 
beyond just § 199A. For example, those who worry about the future of work also 
worry that tax law’s disparate treatment of labor and capital may favor the 
adoption of automation and capital investment rather than the hiring of workers, 
leading to a decline in work.6 This risk has prompted some to propose a tax on 
automation in order to slow down the disappearance of human jobs.7 Others have 
 
Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65 (2017) [hereinafter 
Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?] (describing on-the-ground impacts of worker 
classification); V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of 
Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739 
[hereinafter Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?] (examining long-term ramifications 
of worker classification lawsuits for precarity of gig economy workers). 
6 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in 
the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145, 175 (2018) (arguing for tax-law 
neutrality between humans and robots); Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277, 
328-29 (2019) (recommending parity in taxing labor and capital but cautioning against robot 
tax); Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxes in the Age of Technology, 161 TAX 
NOTES 459, 464 (2018) (“[I]n light of the heavy taxes Congress currently imposes on labor 
income and the increasing availability of labor substitutes, current tax policy incentivizes 
industry and employers to find other modes of productivity that are less costly to employ.”); 
Daniel Hemel, Essay, Does the Tax Code Favor Robots? 13-17 (Dec. 14, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503911 [https://perma.cc/6RA4-JYKG] (critiquing 
claims that U.S. tax law favors capital; automation; and, hence, robots); Kevin J. Delaney, 
The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates, QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-taxes/ 
[https://perma.cc/LBK5-X8TX] (“‘You ought to be willing to raise the tax level and even 
slow down the speed’ of automation, Gates argues. That’s because the technology and 
business cases for replacing humans in a wide range of jobs are arriving simultaneously, and 
it’s important to be able to manage that displacement.”). 
7 See Hideto Koizumi, Optimal Uniform Capital Taxation in a Partially Automated Society 
2 (Oct. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3486827 
[https://perma.cc/LP4E-EYT6] (using robot tax proposals as launching point to explore 
whether capital investments should be taxed differently depending on whether they are routine 
or nonroutine and labor displacing or labor enhancing). 
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proposed a universal basic income—potentially delivered through the tax 
system—as a safeguard against disappearing work.8 
How should we think about § 199A’s role in potentially precipitating a 
widespread shift toward precarious independent contractor work? And if a shift 
does occur, how should it be contextualized and evaluated? This Article 
investigates how the new tax changes are likely to affect and reshape work 
arrangements and lays a normative framework for evaluating any such shifts. It 
argues that although tax law in general has important and underappreciated 
effects on work arrangements, it is difficult to isolate § 199A as the driver of a 
workplace shift. While it is certainly the case that § 199A could make 
independent contractor classification more attractive than employee status for 
some workers, there are several factors that may limit the provision’s effects. 
For example, § 199A’s internal guardrails, agency interpretations, the need to 
satisfy classification tests, and the risk of legal challenges may help limit a 
wholesale shift. Cutting in the other direction, there are tax, legal, and economic 
factors that may exacerbate a workplace shift, including tax law reform; changes 
in agency and court interpretations; and economic shifts, such as increasing 
automation and offshoring of jobs. Section 199A is just one of the recent tax law 
changes that might affect work arrangements, and tax law is just one facet of the 
broader legal and economic conditions that are shaping work.  
This Article also argues that even if § 199A were to trigger a widespread shift 
toward independent contractor arrangements, heterogeneity in jobs and workers 
would demand a nuanced evaluation of such a shift. Drawing on empirical 
research on the state of the contemporary workforce, this Article argues that 
depending on the industry, extent of workforce participation, and other factors 
(including whether the worker holds a primary-employee job), some workers 
may benefit from § 199A while others may be harmed. Still others may be 
relatively unaffected. For example, current survey and tax return data suggest 
that there has been an increase in workers with full-time employment doing 
employee work or independent contractor work as a side job. If such workers 
continue their full-time employee work and receive key benefits and protections 
through this primary employment, we might be less worried about the harms 
 
8 See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case 
for a Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (analyzing and critiquing “fit” between 
libertarian theory and universal basic income); Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Jacob 
Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic Income, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346467 [https://perma.cc/PGY6-3NW6] (“We 
propose a UBI of $6000 per person per year, paid to all citizens and lawful permanent 
residents via direct deposit in biweekly installments.”); Ari Glogower & Clint Wallace, Essay, 
Shades of Basic Income 2 (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 443, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3122146 [https://perma.cc/52MU-XHP3] (“The basic income 
concept, at this level of generality, has generated increasing interest among scholars, 
policymakers, and members of the public around the world and across the political 
spectrum.”). 
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caused by any increase in their independent contractor work prompted by 
§ 199A. As another example, some research suggests that automation presents a 
threat to human work that is susceptible to such replacement.9 For these types of 
at-risk work, § 199A might make hiring workers more feasible by acting as a 
wage subsidy, potentially lessening automation’s threat.10 
In short, this Article’s original contribution is to analyze how recent changes 
in tax law interact with other legal and economic drivers to ultimately shape 
contemporary work arrangements and to articulate a framework for normatively 
evaluating these effects. More broadly, this Article aims to shed light on the 
general phenomenon through which tax law interacts with labor law and other 
protections in shaping work. This Article’s analysis thus provides a roadmap to 
guide ongoing academic and policy analysis of tax reform and its potential 
impacts on the future of work. Its insights are applicable not only with respect 
to the 2017 tax changes but also to evaluating any future tax changes that might 
occur. The 2017 tax changes themselves only became effective for the 2018 tax 
year, so their full impacts on workplace arrangements will likely take a few years 
to manifest.11 Even at this early stage, however, it is important to map the key 
issues. Subsequent research can then build upon this analysis to model the 
effects of tax changes on work and test such models against future empirical 
data. 
This Article proceeds as follows: 
Part I provides the necessary background by explaining § 199A and 
summarizing commentator arguments regarding § 199A’s impact on work 
arrangements—in particular, the claim that the new statute will incentivize a 
broad shift toward an independent contractor workforce. 
Part II discusses what is at stake for labor, employment, tax, and other legal 
purposes in how a worker is classified; describes the evolving legal tests that 
must be satisfied; maps the trade-offs that firms and workers confront in 
determining their preferred classification; and explains how new § 199A might 
change that trade-off and lead to a shift. In doing so, Part II introduces tax 
considerations into a conversation that is usually dominated by concerns over 
labor- and employment-law protections. 
Part III explores the tax, legal, and economic factors that might limit or 
exacerbate a workplace shift, thereby broadening the analysis beyond tax law 
and § 199A. 
 
9 See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing how automation may lead to 
destruction of work, further motivating employees to reclassify themselves and work as 
independent contractors). 
10 But see Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment 
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 303-05 (2018) (arguing that separating worker entitlements from 
employment relationships could reduce incentives to replace human labor with automation 
and to replace employees with “fissured” contractor relationships). 
11 See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1-7702 (2018)) (repeating throughout that “amendments 
made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017”). 
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Part IV turns to normative policy analysis. Drawing on currently available 
empirical research, it argues that because the contemporary workforce is 
heterogeneous, § 199A is likely to impact differently situated workers 
differently. Therefore, concerns about losing worker protections due to a tax-
induced workplace shift may be more warranted for some workers than for 
others. 
At the end of the day, the new tax law changes might not necessarily be good 
policy. But it is important to be clear about what exactly we are concerned about 
and for what reasons. By mapping how tax law changes interact with other legal 
and economic factors to affect work arrangements and by outlining how the risks 
of a shift differ as among differently situated workers, this Article lays a 
foundation for further empirical study of tax law’s impact on the future of work. 
I. THE NEW TAX LAW AND ITS CLAIMED WORKPLACE SHIFT 
We first describe the new pass-through deduction that has generated the 
current debate.12 We then describe the concerns raised by critics about the new 
provision’s effects on the workplace.  
A. The New Pass-Through Deduction and Its Guardrails 
Among the most important domestic changes in the 2017 tax reform was the 
enactment of § 199A. This new provision sought to remedy a tax-rate inequity 
created by the new legislation13; as part of the overall tax reform, the corporate 
tax rate was reduced from 35% to 21%.14 However, businesses operating as pass-
through entities (i.e., partnerships, S corporations, and sole proprietorships) 
were still taxed at the individual tax rates with a maximum marginal rate of 37%. 
To provide tax-rate parity, Congress enacted § 199A. The new provision 
grants qualified partners, S-corporation shareholders, and individuals operating 
a trade or business as sole proprietors a deduction of up to 20% of a specifically 
calculated base of income (i.e., their QBI).15 The deduction is not available to 
 
12 See I.R.C. § 199A (establishing new deduction for independent contractors and other 
pass-through taxpayers but not employees or corporations). 
13 See Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Fin. Comm., to Bob Corker, 
Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (Dec. 18, 2017), reprinted in Hatch: 
Passthrough Provision Result of House-Senate Negotiations, 2017 TAX NOTES TODAY FED. 
242-14 (asserting that § 199A “provide[s] tax relief to pass-through businesses at a level 
similar to that provided to regular ‘C’ corporations”). 
14 See I.R.C. § 11. 
15 Whether and under what circumstances pass-throughs and C corporations have tax-rate 
parity under § 199A is fact specific. See James R. Repetti, The Impact of the 2017 Act’s Tax 
Rate Changes on Choice of Entity, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 686, 714 (2018) (discussing how 
C corporation’s retention of earnings, “qualified small business” status, and share sales may 
impact what tax rate corporation pays); Ruth Simon, A Taxing Choice for Firms: S or C?, 
WALL STREET J., Feb. 23, 2018, at B1 (“Many companies are taking longer to decide because 
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C corporations.16 The 20% deduction reduces the effective tax rate on pass-
through taxpayers, bringing the rate more in line with the C-corporation rate. For 
example, in the case of a taxpayer facing the top 2018 marginal individual tax 
rate of 37%, the ability to take the full § 199A deduction would result in an 
effective marginal tax rate of 29.6%.17 The § 199A deduction is a below-the-line 
deduction taken after the calculation of adjusted gross income, meaning the 
deduction is available to both taxpayers who itemize deductions and those who 
do not.18 However, because tax rates are progressive, the deduction remains 
more valuable to higher-bracket taxpayers.19 
Importantly for our purposes, the new deduction is not available to 
employees. To qualify for the deduction, the taxpayer’s income must be from a 
“qualified trade or business,”20 and the statute specifically excludes the 
performance of services as an employee from the definition of “qualified trade 
or business.”21 This employee exclusion has prompted the criticism that § 199A 
could trigger a broad workplace shift from employee- to independent-contractor-
based relationships, which would lead to a corresponding loss of employee 
benefits and protections.22 Critics have expressed concern that in remedying one 
 
the calculations are complicated, said Milwaukee tax attorney Thomas Nichols, with the 
answers turning on the size of dividend payouts, when the owners expect to sell, expectations 
for what Congress might do down the road, and other factors.”); Bradley T. Borden, Choice-
of-Entity Decisions Under the New Tax Act 1 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Research 
Paper No. 550, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3119829 [https://perma.cc/TD85-W7CC]. 
16 I.R.C. § 199A(a). 
17 80% of 37% = 29.6% (assuming that the net investment income tax in § 1411 does not 
apply). 
18 I.R.C. § 63(b), (d) (making § 199A deduction available to both taxpayers who itemize 
deductions and those who do not). 
19 See id. § 1 (demonstrating that tax rates increase as income increases). 
20 The income must be earned directly as a sole proprietor (which includes independent 
contractors) or through a pass-through entity (such as a partnership or S corporation). Id. 
§ 199A(f)(1)(A). “Sole proprietor” describes a type of noncorporate business for tax filing 
purposes. “Independent contractor” is used to distinguish employees and nonemployees for 
payroll and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”) purposes. An individual providing 
services as an independent contractor would file Schedule C (sole proprietor) with Form 1040 
to report income from the activity and may have to file Schedule SE (self-employment tax) 
as well. See Sole Proprietorships, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses 
/small-businesses-self-employed/sole-proprietorships [https://perma.cc/LH3H-CQ2S] (last 
updated Jan. 16, 2020). 
21 I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-1(b)(14) (2019). 
22 See, e.g., Andrew Velarde, Passthrough Abandonment of Horizontal Equity Means It’s 
Game On, 159 TAX NOTES 1188, 1188 (2018) (discussing incentive created by new deduction 
to become independent contractor); Patricia Cohen, Same Income, but Not Taxes, in G.O.P. 
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2017, at A1 (outlining several examples of inequitable outcomes 
that may arise as a result of this employee exclusion); Noam Scheiber, New Tax Law Offers 
Carrot to Gig Workers, but It May Have Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2018, at B1 (“The new 
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inequity—that between C corporations and pass-through entities—Congress 
might have inadvertently created another: a tax disparity between employees and 
independent contractors, with a clear tilt toward the latter.23 These sentiments 
were widely circulated in the news, on blogs, and in other social media outlets 
in the aftermath of the 2017 tax reform, and we describe them in greater detail 
in Section I.B. 
Regardless of the potential tax advantages of reporting as an independent 
contractor, a worker’s status is not elective. Classification as an independent 
contractor must be supported by the facts. Emphasizing this point, the § 199A 
final regulations, issued in January 2019, provide a rebuttable presumption that 
former employees who switch to independent contractor status remain 
employees.24 This rebuttable presumption shifts the burden to the taxpayer to 
demonstrate that her relationship with her former employer has changed 
sufficiently to merit the new classification as an independent contractor. 
New § 199A contains a number of guardrails that limit the provision’s 
application or curb tax-avoidance behavior, and these guardrails may constrain 
a taxpayer’s ability to take the 20% deduction. The most important guardrails 
are (1) limitations based on the line of business, types of assets held, or 
employees hired by the pass-through business25 and (2) the “reasonable 
compensation” carveout.26  
1. Line of Business, Assets, and Employees 
Section 199A imposes a number of limitations on the deduction’s availability, 
which apply to taxpayers above certain income levels.27 Two major ones are 
based on (1) the nature of the trade or business and (2) the amount of Form W-2 
wages paid by the pass-through taxpayer to its employees and the extent of the 
taxpayer’s investment in qualified depreciable property.  
 
tax law is likely to accelerate a hotly disputed trend in the American economy by rewarding 
workers who sever formal relationships with their employers and become contractors.”). 
23 See, e.g., Kamin et al., supra note 4, at 1459-61 (discussing employee incentives after 
§ 199A); Tony Nitti, Making Sense of the New ‘20% Qualified Business Income Deduction,’ 
FORBES (Dec. 26, 2017, 8:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2017/12/26 
/tax-geek-tuesday-making-sense-of-the-new-20-qualified-business-income-deduction/ 
[https://perma.cc/HVP7-QN97] (noting potential disparity and whether statute’s limitations 
remedy it). 
24 Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3)(i). 
25 I.R.C. § 199A(d)-(e). 
26 Id. § 199A(c)(4). 
27 Id. § 199A(e)(2) (adjusting for inflation). Taxable income thresholds are determined 
without regard to the § 199A deduction and are not limited to income from the qualified trade 
or business. Id. § 199A(b)(3)(A). 
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a. Nature of Services 
First, if a taxpayer is in a specified service trade or business (“SSTB”) and 
has taxable income over certain statutory limits, her § 199A deduction will be 
reduced or even eliminated.28 If taxable income is less than the statutory 
threshold, the taxpayer may take the full § 199A deduction regardless of her 
SSTB.29 If the taxpayer earns above this threshold and is in an SSTB, then 
eligibility for the deduction is gradually reduced and eventually eliminated.30 
SSTB is defined to include the performance of services in a wide array of 
fields including health, law, financial services, accounting, actuarial science, 
performing arts, consulting, athletics, brokerage services, and “any trade or 
business where the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or 
skill of 1 or more of its employees.”31 In addition, § 199A adds investing; 
investment management; and trading or dealing in securities, partnership 
interests, or commodities to the list of prohibited businesses.32 
The bottom line is that for higher-income taxpayers, a business that 
constitutes the performance of services in one or more of a sweeping list of 
categories cannot benefit from § 199A—at least not without real planning.33 The 
list of prohibited services also includes broad language encompassing any trade 
or business in which the principal asset is reputation or skill.34 This language, 
which could have served as a significant limitation on the availability of the 
deduction, was defined narrowly in the final regulations.35 In the case of lower-
 
28 Id. § 199A(d)(1)(A) (clarifying that a “specified service trade or business” is not a 
“qualified trade or business”). 
29 Id. § 199A(b)(3)(A). The threshold was $157,500 for individual filers and $315,000 for 
joint return filers as enacted in 2017. Id. § 199A(e)(2). The inflation-adjusted amounts for 
2020 are $163,300 for individual filers and $326,000 for joint returns. Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 
2019-47 I.R.B. 1099. 
30 I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3)(A). If that taxpayer earns $213,300 or more ($426,000 for joint 
filers), she may not take the deduction at all. Id. 
31 Id. §§ 199A(d)(2)(A), 1202(e)(3)(A). Although § 1202(e)(3)(A) includes “engineering” 
and “architecture,” § 199A(d)(2)(A) explicitly directs that § 1202(e)(3)(A) be applied without 
regard to those terms. 
32 Id. § 199A(d)(2)(B). 
33 For businesses engaged in multiple activities including a specified service, the 
regulations provide a simplified approach for determining whether the specified services 
effectively taint the trade or business or are de minimis and can be ignored. See Prop. Treas. 
Reg. § 1.199A-5(c), 83 Fed. Reg. 40,895, 40,896 (Aug. 16, 2018). 
34 Although I.R.C. § 1202(e)(3)(A) speaks of the “reputation or skill of 1 or more of its 
employees,” § 199A modifies this for the 20% deduction. The limitation applies if the 
principal asset is the reputation or skill of “employees or owners.” I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2)(A). 
Thus, an owner who is not formally an employee could trigger the exclusion from qualified 
trade status or business status. 
35 See Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(b)(2)(xiv) (2019). 
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income taxpayers, for whom worker protections may be especially important, 
this nature-of-services guardrail poses no constraint. 
b. Wages and Investment in Qualified Depreciable Property 
The second restriction requires pass-through taxpayers with taxable income 
over certain thresholds36 to either (1) pay a minimum amount of wages to 
employees or (2) pay a lesser amount of wages but also deploy a minimum 
amount of qualified depreciable assets in the business in order to secure the full 
20% deduction.37 This means that insufficient payment of W-2 wages or 
investment in qualified depreciable property will reduce the § 199A deduction 
for higher-income taxpayers. Businesses that have adequate employee payroll 
would likely satisfy the wage-only option.38 And businesses with little labor but 
significant depreciable assets would likely satisfy the wage-plus-property 
option, preserving the full 20% deduction.39 
Both the nature-of-services limitation and the wage-only or investment-in-
property limitation add significant complexity to § 199A and limit the 
deduction’s availability. Neither of these provisions apply to taxpayers below 
the statutory taxable income thresholds, and they hence do not restrain lower-
income taxpayers from taking the deduction. But with respect to workers above 
the thresholds, the additional restrictions could not only result in fewer of those 
taxpayers being eligible for the deduction but also lead to more behavioral 
distortions as taxpayers structure their enterprises to circumvent these 
limitations. 
2. The “Reasonable Compensation” Carveout 
As noted, the availability of the § 199A deduction depends in part on the 
amount of the taxpayer’s QBI.40 QBI generally refers to the net amount of 
income, gains, deductions, and losses with respect to the taxpayer’s “qualified 
trade or business”41 if such items are effectively connected with a U.S. trade or 
 
36 The thresholds are the same as those for determining SSTB status. See supra note 29. 
37 I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2)(B). The taxpayer’s allowable deduction is limited to the lesser of 
(1) 20% of QBI or (2) the greater of 50% of W-2 wages paid in the trade or business or 25% 
of W-2 wages plus 2.5% of the unadjusted basis immediately after acquisition of qualified 
property. Id. For 2020 taxpayers with taxable income below the $163,300/$326,000 threshold 
amount, the W-2 wage/depreciable property limitation will not apply. For taxpayers earning 
at or over the threshold amount, the application of the wage/depreciable property limitation is 
phased in, and it applies in full if the taxpayer earns $213,300 or more ($426,600 for joint 
filers). Id. § 199A(b)(3). 
38 See Repetti, supra note 15, at 694-95. 
39 See id. at 695. 
40 I.R.C. § 199A(a)-(c). 
41 Id. § 199A(c)(1). 
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business of the taxpayer and are includible in taxable income for the tax year.42 
In general, the higher the QBI, the better for the taxpayer.43 
The statute excludes from QBI the amount of “reasonable compensation paid 
to the taxpayer by any qualified trade or business of the taxpayer for services 
rendered with respect to the trade or business.”44 Because high QBI maximizes 
the § 199A deduction, a reduction in QBI due to the “reasonable compensation” 
exclusion would limit the available deduction. The “reasonable compensation” 
language draws on terminology found in the tax law governing S corporations, 
which suggests that, at a minimum, compensation-like payments made to a 
taxpayer from a qualified trade or business conducted through an S corporation 
in which that taxpayer is a shareholder will not count as part of QBI in computing 
the deduction.45 However, ambiguous statutory language left open the question 
of whether the reasonable-compensation limitation applied to independent 
contractors and partners as well. If the limitation applied, independent 
contractors filing as sole proprietors could have faced the risk that all their 
payments from the “trade or business” of offering their services would be treated 
as their reasonable compensation, leaving nothing to count as QBI and 
eliminating the § 199A deduction. The U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(“Treasury”) answered this question in the final regulations, concluding that the 
reasonable-compensation limitation applies only to S-corporation 
shareholders.46 Accordingly, this guardrail should not limit independent 
contractors’ access to the § 199A deduction. 
B. The Logic and Limits of the Claimed Workplace Shift 
A frequent criticism in the immediate aftermath of the legislation’s enactment 
was that new § 199A created a significant incentive for workers to give up 
employee protections and become independent contractors.47 In an article 
critiquing the new legislation, a group of thirteen law professors wrote:  
 
42 Id. § 199A(c)(3)(A). 
43 More granularly, the statute provides for the deduction of the lesser of “combined 
qualified business income” of the taxpayer or 20% of taxable income other than net capital 
gain income plus 20% of qualified cooperative dividends of the taxpayer. Id. § 199A(a). 
“Combined qualified business income” is 20% of the taxpayer’s QBI for each of her qualified 
trades or businesses, subject to another limitation based on W-2 wages. Id. § 199A(b); see 
Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-2(c)(1)(iv), (d)(2) (2019) (antistuffing rule). 
44 I.R.C. § 199A(c)(4). Related carveouts exist for § 707(c) guaranteed payments, which 
are paid to partners “for services rendered with respect to the trade or business,” and for 
certain payments to partners by partnerships for services rendered with respect to the trade or 
business, to the extent provided for by regulations. Id. § 199A(c)(4)(A)-(B). 
45 H.R. REP. No. 115-466, at 215 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(H). 
47 See, e.g., Russell A. Hollrah & Patrick A. Hollrah, New Passthrough Deduction Creates 
Tax Benefit for Self-Employed, 158 TAX NOTES 1051, 1051 (2018) (noting that new § 199A 
“helps eliminate the financial consequences of this disparate [payroll tax] treatment” between 
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[The pass-through deduction] potentially remains good news for anyone 
who can quit their job and become either an independent contractor (and 
so be considered a sole proprietor) or a partner in a firm. The game is clear: 
do not be John Doe, employee. Be John Doe, independent contractor or 
partner in an LLC, receiving a profit share rather than wages.48 
As the article states, the risk is further heightened by the ongoing difficulty 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has experienced in policing the line 
between employee and independent contractor even in the absence of such an 
explicit tax carrot.49 The article’s authors individually repeated these concerns 
both in testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance in April 201850 and 
 
independent contractors and employees); Velarde, supra note 22, at 1188; Batchelder & 
Kamin, supra note 4, at A18; Narenda Acharya & Jordan Faykus, New Tax Law Could 
Incentivize Employees to Become Independent Contractors—Employers Should Proceed with 
Caution, COMPENSATION CONNECTION (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.thecompensation 
connection.com/2018/01/23/new-tax-law-could-incentivize-employees-to-become-
independent-contractors-employers-should-proceed-with-caution/ [https://perma.cc/665P-
8JGP]. 
48 Kamin et al., supra note 4, at 1463. 
49 “The bottom line is that these techniques will cover a wide swath of relatively high-
income taxpayers who were previously employees. Employers already have some 
incentive to characterize workers as independent contractor[s], and the IRS has faced 
serious challenges enforcing the tax distinction between the two. This pressure will 
greatly increase with the added tax gaming incentives created by the new pass-through 
deduction. Moreover, for those employees who cannot easily recharacterize themselves 
as independent contractors, similar tax benefits can be achieved through the employees 
becoming partners in the relevant business.” 
Id. at 1464 (footnote omitted). 
50 “If someone is an independent contractor, for instance, that person apparently gets the 
deduction, based on guidance so far. This is true even if the person were doing similar 
work as an employee—just without employee benefits and somewhat less supervision, 
for instance (some of the criteria that differentiate employees from independent 
contractors). There is no good reason to preference independent contractor status—but 
that is the result of this provision. And it sets up a complicated trade-off for workers to 
assess: weighing the now larger tax savings from being an independent contractor to the 
detriments of leaving behind employee benefits.” 
Early Impressions of the New Tax Law: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong. 
66-67 (2018) (statement of David Kamin, Professor of Law, New York University School of 
Law) (footnote omitted). 
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in a national op-ed.51 These types of concerns were echoed elsewhere in the 
popular press.52 
Thus, as expressed by these commentators and others, the concerns are that 
(1) workers may give up employee status (i.e., quit their jobs) and choose 
independent contractor jobs or (2) workers may attempt to reclassify employee 
positions (or be reclassified in those positions) as independent contractor 
positions, giving up benefits and protections.53 While there is some reference to 
preexisting employer-side incentives to characterize workers as independent 
contractors, much of the concern being expressed centers on the effects of 
§ 199A on worker incentives to either switch jobs or reclassify. 
This focus makes apparent sense given that the worker takes the deduction, 
not the hiring firm, but it is incomplete in several key ways. The worker-
incentive focus does not answer the empirical question of where the incidence 
of this new deduction will fall. Nor does it contain a nuanced account of how 
hiring firms might negotiate and bargain with workers in reconfiguring work 
arrangements. The question of whether workers or hiring firms will ultimately 
capture the benefit of the deduction is an important empirical question that must 
inform our normative evaluation of the new statute and its impact on the 
workforce.54 
Additionally, attention to § 199A’s worker incentives ignores the power of 
other tax law changes to potentially affect work choices and arrangements. As 
discussed below, these include raising the standard deduction and repealing the 
individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s 
(“ACA”).55 Finally, overly focusing on § 199A fails to take into account the 
economic backdrop against which the tax law changes are occurring. Two 
contemporary trends—the increase in offshoring jobs to lower-cost locations 
and the rise of job-displacing automation—along with other legal and economic 
 
51 “The new deduction could have profound effects on the American workplace over 
time. It essentially requires employees—most workers—to choose between benefits such 
as employer-based healthcare and the deduction. By creating a strong incentive for 
employees to give up these benefits and become independent contractors, it could further 
erode job, health and retirement security.” 
Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 4, at A18; see David Kamin, Uncertainty, Perverse 
Incentives, and More, MEDIUM (Jan. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/whatever-source-
derived/uncertainty-perverse-incentives-and-more-a7af2d143a70 [https://perma.cc/H8AR-
G9YP]. 
52 See Cohen, supra note 22, at A1; Scheiber, supra note 22, at B1 (“The new tax law is 
likely to accelerate a hotly disputed trend in the American economy by rewarding workers 
who sever formal relationships with their employers and become contractors.”); Acharya & 
Faykus, supra note 47. 
53 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
54 Some attention is also directed to higher-income taxpayers who are sophisticated tax 
planners and may play games with their classification in order to take advantage of the 
deduction. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
55 See infra Part III. 
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factors might either limit or exacerbate a workplace shift. Ultimately, § 199A is 
only one aspect of the 2017 tax law changes that might affect work 
arrangements, and tax law is only one aspect of the broader legal and economic 
environment that is shaping work. 
The remainder of this Article explains the trade-offs between tax and labor 
considerations at stake in deciding how to structure work, broadens the inquiry 
by assessing the tax and other legal and economic factors that might limit or 
exacerbate workplace shifts, and articulates a normative framework for 
evaluating any shifts that might occur. 
II. THE WORKER CLASSIFICATION TRADE-OFF 
Will the new tax law prompt a shift toward independent contractor work? And 
if the predicted shift occurs, should it be regarded as problematic? To answer 
these questions, we first explain why worker classification matters for labor law, 
employment law, and tax purposes; how each field decides to classify workers; 
and what factors firms and workers consider in making decisions about 
workplace structures and worker classification. Parts III and IV of this Article 
will then explore the extent to which an independent contractor shift is likely to 
occur as a result of the intersection of tax law (including § 199A), nontax legal 
regimes, and economic factors and how such a shift ought to be evaluated in 
light of real-world data and contemporary trends. 
A. Why Classification Matters 
U.S. law generally groups workers into two categories—employee and 
independent contractor. It does so despite the fact that real-world work 
arrangements exist on a spectrum, with classic controlled-employee 
arrangements at one end and self-directed independent entrepreneurs at the 
other. The binary classification system of U.S. law demands that all real-life 
variations be placed into one of two legal boxes, thus shaping and distorting 
workplace arrangements.56 One cannot just pick a classification; one also has to 
ensure that the work arrangement meets the legal tests supporting that 
classification. Parties might therefore incur costs to structure work arrangements 
 
56 The literature on the subject is voluminous. See generally, e.g., Marc Linder, Dependent 
and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted 
in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 187 (1999); Mitchell H. 
Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and 
Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an Employer-and-Employee 
Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605 (2012); Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in 
the Sharing Economy: Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 53 (2015); Jenna Amato Moran, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee? 
Misclassification of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105 (2010). 
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to fit within a certain box and to reduce the risk of being penalized and 
reclassified into the other box.57 
So, why would workers and those hiring them prefer one box to another? 
Many legal regimes allocate rights, burdens, benefits, and responsibilities 
differently depending on whether workers are employees or independent 
contractors. Most pertinently, labor and employment law protections under the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) are tied to worker classification.58 However, worker classification 
matters in other legal areas as well (such as tax law, tort law, civil rights law, 
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)).59 The effects of 
worker classification are borne most directly by workers and those hiring them. 
But more broadly, society may also bear some externalized impacts of worker 
classification trends and may thus have an indirect interest in classification 
outcomes.60 
The following discussion highlights some of the main reasons worker 
classification matters, with particular emphasis on the less noticed tax and tax-
related reasons it is significant. 
1. Labor, Employment, and Other Legal Protections 
Employee classification grants workers a number of crucial rights under 
federal law, perhaps the most important of which are labor and employment 
protections developed in the New Deal era. For labor law purposes, the right to 
collectively bargain under the NLRA belongs only to those classified as 
employees.61 Workers deemed to be independent contractors receive no such 
NLRA protections. Provisions of the FLSA establish overtime pay laws and 
minimum wage laws that apply to employees62 but not to independent 
 
57 See David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four 
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 141 (2015). 
58 See Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker 
Classification Fights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2018, at 107, 120-21 (describing 
benefits available to employees under NLRA and FLSA). 
59 See Agnieszka A. McPeak, Regulating Ridesharing Platforms Through Tort Law, 39 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 357, 376-80 (2017) (exploring differences in tort liability between employees 
and independent contractors); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Issues in the Sharing 
Economy: Implications for Workers, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE 
SHARING ECONOMY 343, 345-46 (Nestor M. Davidson, Michèle Finck & John J. Infranca eds., 
2018) (detailing tax implications of worker classification). 
60 See generally Exploring the “Gig Economy” and the Future of Retirement Savings: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health and Ret. Sec. of the S. Comm. on Health, 
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 115th Cong. (2018) (studying impact of nonstandard work 
arrangements on retirement security and healthcare). 
61 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (2018) (defining “employee” to exclude “independent 
contractors” and granting employees right to collectively bargain). 
62 Id. §§ 206-207 (establishing minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws for employees). 
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contractors.63 Other federal laws guarantee unpaid leave and establish health-
and-safety regulations for employees.64 Employees also benefit from enhanced 
antidiscrimination protections65 and retirement, disability, and medical benefits 
not comparable to those available to independent contractors.66 In addition to 
federal-level protections, there are comparable provisions benefitting workers 
classified as employees at the state level.67 
However, the actual protective value of these multiple worker protections 
may be limited either through statutory parameters (e.g., the degree to which the 
NLRA does not offer protections to managers), through emerging legal trends 
(e.g., forced arbitration of worker claims), or through new forms of employment 
contracts (e.g., zero-hour or zero-benefits contracts). Still, given the scope of 
these protections and benefits, the definition of covered employees in these legal 
regimes carries tremendous weight. Securing employee status can be immensely 
attractive, particularly for workers who lack other means of self-protecting or 
insuring. From the perspective of hiring firms, on the other hand, employee 
status for workers is likely to impose greater costs than independent contractor 
status would.68 For example, workers classified as employees must be paid 
 
63 See id. § 203 (defining “employee” for purposes of FLSA). 
64 E.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2018) 
(focusing on reduction of safety and health hazards at place of work); Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018) (entitling employees to “reasonable leave for 
medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or 
parent who has a serious health condition”); see Oei, supra note 58, at 120 (discussing federal 
protections for employees). 
65 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Protection under this Act does not 
extend to independent contractors. Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 944 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (observing that Title VII protections cover employees but not independent 
contractors). 
66 E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2018) 
(prohibiting “arbitrary age discrimination in employment”); Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2018) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of disability); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. at 252-53 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (prohibiting discrimination against employees on basis of sex, 
race, color, national origin, or religion). 
67 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 226 (West 2019) (obligating employers to provide itemized 
statements to employees); id. § 351 (prohibiting employers from taking employee tips); id. 
§ 2806 (obligating employers to reimburse employee mileage costs); State Minimum Wage 
Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#stateDetails 
[https://perma.cc/ALT9-9DB7] (last updated Jan. 1, 2020) (listing each state’s minimum 
wage and its relationship to federal wage laws). 
68 See Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee 
Compensation—September 2019 (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf 
/ecec.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z22X-AVG3] (finding that wages and salaries accounted for 
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minimum wage and overtime.69 Collective bargaining may drive up wages and 
other costs, driving down profit margins.70 
The effects of worker classification on hiring firms and workers will partially 
depend on market dynamics and relative bargaining power.71 If labor supply is 
relatively elastic or qualified labor is in short supply, workers classified as 
independent contractors may be able to extract value from those hiring them, 
such that any loss of direct protections due to their nonemployee status are 
compensated for or are rendered less significant.72 For example, highly trained 
experts in certain fields may be well remunerated despite being independent 
contractors.73 On the flip side, if workers are not in a position to effectively 
negotiate for increased compensation or benefits, loss of employee classification 
may be devastating.  
2. Tax Consequences 
Alongside the big-ticket labor and employment law regimes, tax law has 
exerted a relatively unnoticed parallel influence on worker classification 
choices. The primary tax implications of worker status aside from § 199A are 
(1) who bears unemployment and payroll (Social Security and Medicare) 
taxes,74 (2) how wage withholding or information reporting are performed and 
 
approximately 68.7% of employee compensation and that benefit costs accounted for 
remaining 31.3%). 
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. 
70 See LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHEW WALTERS, ECON. POLICY INST., HOW UNIONS HELP 
ALL WORKERS 2 (2003), https://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6U6P-MHV5] (arguing that unions raise wages by approximately 20% and 
compensation, including both wages and benefits, by approximately 28%). 
71 See Paula B. Voos & Lawrence R. Mishel, The Union Impact on Profits: Evidence from 
Industry Price-Cost Margin Data, 4 J. LAB. ECON. 105, 106 (1986) (building upon prior 
studies showing that unions reduce profits); Verne Kopytoff, How Amazon Crushed the Union 
Movement, TIME (Jan. 16, 2014), https://time.com/956/how-amazon-crushed-the-union-
movement/) [https://perma.cc/SG2Z-5QTX] (noting relationship between Amazon’s efforts 
to stop unionization and labor costs’ impact on profit margins). 
72 See, e.g., Robert McClelland & Shannon Mok, A Review of Recent Research on Labor 
Supply Elasticities (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2012-12, 2012), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25-2012-Recent_Research_ 
on_Labor_Supply_Elasticities.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR4J-UE7X]. 
73 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, COUNCIL OF ECON. 
ADVISORS & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 12, 62 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs 
/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGX9-C56N] (“Licensed 
practitioners . . . might earn more than they would in an unlicensed market . . . .”). 
74 See Federal Insurance Contribution Act of 1935, I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2018) 
(establishing payroll tax obligations on employees and employers); Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act, id. §§ 3301-3311 (establishing unemployment tax obligations on employers). 
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whether estimated tax payments must be made,75 (3) whether the worker is 
entitled to deductions for expenses she incurs in the performance of the work, 
and (4) what types of fringe benefits can be taken by the worker tax free.76 With 
the introduction of § 199A, classification of a worker now plays a gatekeeping 
role in determining whether that worker is potentially eligible for the § 199A 
deduction. Finally, worker classification matters with respect to healthcare and 
retirement benefits—social insurance benefits that are delivered through the Tax 
Code.  
a. Social Security and Unemployment Taxes 
Federal tax law imposes a Social Security tax totaling 12.4% on worker wages 
up to $137,700 for 2020 and a 2.9% Medicare tax with no salary cap, regardless 
of whether the worker is classified as an employee or an independent 
contractor.77 For employees, these taxes are collectively known as Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes. For independent contractors, they 
are known as Self-Employment Contributions Act (“SECA”) taxes. Together, 
these taxes fund Social Security and Medicare. However, they are paid to the 
federal government differently depending on how the worker is classified. 
Employers withhold half the Social Security tax (totaling 6.2%) from 
employees’ wages and pay it over to the IRS; the other half (6.2%) is an 
employer portion paid by the employer.78 Similarly, employers withhold half the 
Medicare tax (totaling 1.45%) from employees’ wages and pay it over to the 
IRS; the other half (1.45%) is owed and paid by the employer.79 Thus, for 
workers classified as employees, half the amount of payroll taxes is nominally 
imposed on the employer, who also handles all of the administrative reporting 
and payment obligations for both the employer portion and the employee 
portion. By contrast, for independent contractors the same total Social Security 
tax of 12.4% is due on self-employment income, but all of the tax is owed and 
 
75 See I.R.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3501, 6041, 6050W; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMPLOYER’S 
TAX GUIDE 21-25 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5TP-
K6QD] (discussing employer withholding obligations on employee wages). 
76 I.R.C. §§ 62, 67, 132. 
77 Id. § 3111(a); Press Release, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Fact Sheet: 2020 Social Security 
Changes 1 (2020), https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2020.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5FWR-N3HU]. A Medicare surtax is imposed on workers whose wages or self-
employment income exceeds a certain threshold. What Is the Additional Medicare Tax?, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/what-is-the-
additional-medicare-tax [https://perma.cc/WXR4-WR43]. 
78 See sources cited supra note 77. 
79 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 75, at 24. The incidence of the tax may not match 
legal liability. 
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paid by the worker.80 Moreover, the independent contractor also bears the 
responsibility for reporting and paying the entire 2.9% Medicare tax to the IRS.81  
Another difference between employees and independent contractors is that 
those who hire employees are responsible for the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act (“FUTA”) tax,82 a payroll tax equal to 6% of the first $7000 of wages.83 The 
unemployment insurance system is a unified federal-state system and 
unemployment taxes are paid at the state and federal levels.84 Employers can 
claim a credit of up to 5.4% against their federal FUTA tax liability for amounts 
paid to state unemployment funds (“SUTA” taxes), thereby reducing their net 
federal FUTA tax to 0.6%.85 The actual unemployment insurance regimes are 
administered at the state level under federal guidelines, and the federal taxes 
collected fund federal oversight of state programs as well as loans needed by 
states to cover insurance payouts.86 
Unlike employees, independent contractors are not generally covered by 
unemployment programs and do not have to pay FUTA taxes.87 
Correspondingly, they cannot claim unemployment benefits. 
b. Withholding, Information Reporting, and Estimated Taxes 
How wages and income are reported and income tax paid over to the IRS also 
differs for employees and independent contractors. Employers withhold state 
and federal income taxes and Social Security taxes from amounts paid to 
employees and transmit these amounts to the government.88 Employers then 
 
80 I.R.C. § 1401(a); Press Release, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., supra note 77, at 1; see Kathleen 
DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1422-25 (2018) (noting 
onerous compliance obligations on independent contractors). 
81 I.R.C. § 1401(b). 
82 Id. §§ 3301-3311 (imposing tax on employers). 
83 Id. § 3301. 
84 See generally Peter J. Allman, Withholding, Social Security and Unemployment Taxes 
on Compensation, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 392-6th, at 38-39 (2018) (providing 
overview of FUTA taxes). 
85 See, e.g., I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2014-0022 (June 6, 2014) (explaining federal-state 
unemployment-compensation regime). 
86 FUTA Credit Reduction, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses 
/small-businesses-self-employed/futa-credit-reduction [https://perma.cc/M7SR-3HFL] (last 
updated Jan. 16, 2020) (explaining credit reduction state and its impact on employment taxes). 
87 Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14 LAB. 
LAW. 457, 457 (1999). States use their own classification tests. See, e.g., UI and Independent 
Contractors, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.labor.ny.gov/ui/claimantinfo/ui%20and% 
20independent%20contractors.shtm [https://perma.cc/8YJZ-2YUM] (last visited Feb. 25, 
2020) (outlining New York’s test for determining worker status). 
88 I.R.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3501. 
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report such amounts to both the IRS and the worker on a Form W-2.89 Payments 
to independent contractors, by contrast, are not subject to withholding by payors. 
Instead, independent contractors generally receive a Form 1099 from the payor, 
which simply reports amounts paid, and the payor also sends a copy to the IRS 
(so-called “information reporting”).90 Because there is no withholding on 
income as it is earned, the independent contractor is responsible for paying all 
taxes owed and for making quarterly estimated tax payments.91 The estimated 
tax obligation is not only for income tax but also for self-employment taxes 
(Social Security and Medicare) and the alternative minimum tax. Failure to pay 
the required quarterly estimated taxes over the course of the year can result in 
taxpayer penalties.92 
c. Expense Recovery and Income Inclusion 
How a worker is classified also impacts her ability to deduct the expenses she 
incurs in performing the work. Prior to the 2017 tax reform, employees who 
incurred unreimbursed expenses in performing employment duties were 
theoretically permitted to deduct those employee expenses.93 However, these 
and certain other costs (together called “miscellaneous itemized deductions”) 
were deductible only to the extent that they exceeded 2% of the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income.94 This 2% floor meant that the deduction was realistically 
only available for taxpayers with high expenses relative to income. By contrast, 
workers classified as independent contractors were able to deduct their ordinary 
 
89 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM W-2 WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw2.pdf [https://perma.cc/86MV-QTGP] (last visited Feb. 
25, 2020). 
90 See I.R.C. §§ 6041, 6050W, 6654(c) and accompanying regulations. For tax literature 
on information reporting, see generally Leandra Lederman, Essay, Reducing Information 
Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1733 (2010) (discussing information reporting laws and proposals); Leandra Lederman, 
Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
695 (2007) (arguing that federal income tax law can foster compliance using third-party 
structural incentives); Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 283 (2018) (discussing challenges to income reporting). 
91 I.R.C. § 6654 (requiring payment of taxes in quarterly installments). See generally 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX WITHHOLDING AND ESTIMATED TAX (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY4B-ZCUV] (discussing 
payment of estimated tax); Alan J. Tarr, Estimated Tax, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 581-
3rd (2019) (discussing estimated taxes, obligations to pay, and penalties for failure to make 
payments); Estimated Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses 
/small-businesses-self-employed/estimated-taxes [https://perma.cc/E4NZ-UM6W] (last 
updated Jan. 16, 2020). 
92 I.R.C. § 6654 (setting forth penalties for failure to pay estimated income tax). 
93 Id. § 162. 
94 Id. §§ 62, 67. 
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and necessary business expenses—commonly referred to as “above the line” 
deductions—without limitation on IRS Form 1040, Schedule C.95 For workers 
classified as independent contractors who incur significant work-related costs 
(for example, Uber drivers who use their own cars), the ability to deduct these 
costs could dramatically reduce their effective tax rates. 
The 2017 tax legislation suspended miscellaneous itemized deductions 
(including the deduction for employee expenses) starting in 2018 and effective 
for taxable years beginning before January 1, 2026. That is, rather than simply 
limiting employee business deductions, the tax reform completely bars any such 
deductions through 2025.96 This is potentially significant for employees with 
high business expenses. Independent contractors continue to be able to deduct 
their trade or business expenses in full. Thus, § 199A aside, the 2017 tax reform 
also widened the gap between employees and independent contractors in terms 
of business-expense recovery.  
d. Fringe Benefits and Other Exclusions from Income 
Worker classification also affects the availability of exclusions from income. 
Building on a tradition of common law, industry practice, and IRS rulings, a 
number of tax statutes permit employees to exclude from income certain benefits 
received from their employers. Examples include employee discounts, de 
minimis fringe benefits, on-site gyms, and parking.97 Independent contractors, 
by contrast, can receive many but not all of these types of benefits tax free. For 
example, under tax regulations, any individual receiving a de minimis fringe 
benefit (excludable under § 132(a)(4)) is deemed an employee for purposes of 
excluding that benefit, thus making the exclusion available to independent 
contractors as well as employees.98 By contrast, independent contractors 
performing services for a business may not exclude the value of parking or of 
the use of consumer goods provided under a testing program.99 While employees 
 
95 Id. § 162. 
96 Id. § 67(g); see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045, 131 Stat. 2054, 
2088 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. § 67) (suspending itemized deductions under § 67 of Tax 
Code). 
97 I.R.C. § 132 (identifying employer-provided amenities that do not factor into 
employee’s taxable gross income). 
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b)(4) (2019) (“For purposes of section 132(a)(4) (relating to de 
minimis fringes), the term ‘employee’ means any recipient of a fringe benefit.”); INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., FRINGE BENEFIT GUIDE 14 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf 
/p5137.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F4S-C7DW] (providing same definition of “employee” for 
purposes of fringe benefits). 
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b)(2); William E. Elwood & Cynthia A. Moore, Employee Fringe 
Benefits, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) No. 394-5th, at 150 (2018) (“[T]he regulations 
specifically deny independent contractors the special exclusion under § 132(a)(3) with respect 
to working condition parking benefits and the use of goods or for qualified consumer product 
testing.”). 
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can generally receive more fringe benefits tax free, independent contractors are 
nonetheless eligible for a notable number of these benefits.100 Thus, the 
treatment of fringe benefits provides less tilt in favor of one category over the 
other than differences in business-expense deductibility. 
e. Section 199A 
Then, of course, there is § 199A. As a threshold matter, the new provision is 
only available to taxpayers who operate as independent contractors. Employees 
are barred from the deduction. While some independent contractors may be 
limited in their ability to take the deduction as a result of factors such as their 
line of business or income level, those classified as employees are denied the 
deduction outright. As discussed in Section I.B, it is for this reason that 
commentators have expressed concern that § 199A will create a significant shift 
toward independent contractor work.101 
3. Tax-Delivered Social Welfare Benefits 
A third category of tax-related consequences that hinges on how a worker is 
classified is social welfare benefits delivered through the Tax Code, sometimes 
referred to as tax expenditures. 
a. Healthcare Incentives 
Healthcare benefits delivered through the Tax Code are another way in which 
worker classification differences may matter, though the picture is muddy. Here, 
two topics are important: (1) benefits predating the 2010 ACA and (2) the 
changes that occurred upon enactment of the ACA.102 
 
100 See Kurt L.P. Lawson, Tax Status: Employee vs. Independent Contractor and Employee 
vs. Partner, 62 WM. & MARY ANN. TAX. CONF., 2016, tab 15, at 8-10 (discussing fringe 
benefits for nonemployees). 
101 Even prior to § 199A, the shift from employee to independent contractor could impact 
a worker’s ability to secure the earned income tax credit (“EITC”) or the size of that credit. 
I.R.C. § 32. The EITC is available to individuals based on their “earned income,” whether 
wages or net self-employment income, assuming other requirements are met and that earned 
income and adjusted gross income (“AGI”) thresholds are not exceeded. If the shift to 
independent contractor results in higher pay from the firm (and higher earned income) and/or 
an increased ability to deduct work-related expenses, the available EITC could either increase 
or decrease depending on the facts. New § 199A is taken below the line, and thus this 
deduction does not impact the two key calculations of earned income and AGI. See id. § 62(a). 
However, shifts in classifications resulting from § 199A might have the impacts described 
above (including increased pay and/or increased availability of work-related business 
deductions). 
102 See generally id. § 4980H (describing payment due from certain employers not 
providing employee health coverage); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122 
(2018)). 
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Even before the ACA, the Tax Code provided slightly different incentives for 
the provision of health insurance to employees than for independent contractors. 
Employers may take a tax deduction for the portion of employee health 
insurance premiums that they pay.103 Employees may exclude the value of these 
employer-paid insurance premiums from income104 and may exclude the receipt 
of medical benefits under their plans as well.105 Additionally, the value of this 
benefit is excluded from the wage tax base for purposes of Social Security and 
Medicare taxes and from the employer’s FUTA tax base.106 
Self-employed individuals (sole proprietors, qualified S-corporation 
shareholders, and partners) can deduct the health insurance premiums they pay 
for themselves, their spouses, and their covered dependents from gross 
income.107 They can also exclude the receipt of medical benefits under their 
plans.108 However, by contrast to employees, these health insurance premiums 
are not deductible in calculating the self-employment tax base (upon which 
Social Security and Medicare taxes are computed).109 
Thus, while there may have been some advantage to being classified as an 
employee with respect to healthcare incentives, independent contractors 
traditionally benefited from some tax-based healthcare incentives as well. The 
commonly held view that health insurance is a valuable benefit of employee 
status110 likely reflects employees’ ability to obtain better and less-expensive 
 
103 I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (providing for deduction of such expenses). 
104 I.R.C. § 106. 
105 Id. § 105(b). 
106 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE TO FRINGE BENEFITS 6 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf [https://perma.cc/42FM-Q7QZ] (displaying wage 
tax basis); Employee Benefits: Fringe Benefits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits 
[https://perma.cc/6ZV8-T3GW] (last updated Jan. 16, 2020) (stating rules for calculating 
wage tax base). 
107 I.R.C. § 162(l); David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of 
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- 
and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 681-83 (2012) (noting limitations on 
deductibility for self-employed taxpayers). 
108 I.R.C. § 104(a)(3). 
109 Id. § 162(l)(4). 
110 See Paul Fronstin & Lisa Greenwald, Value of Workplace Benefits: Findings from the 
2016 Health and Voluntary Workplace Benefits Survey, EBRI NOTES, Apr. 2017, at 2, 4 fig.2 
(2017) (reporting that in survey of 1500 workers, health insurance was listed as most 
important employee benefit, with 64% ranking it as “extremely important” and 23% listing it 
as “very important”); Kerry Jones, The Most Desirable Employee Benefits, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Feb. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/the-most-desirable-employee-benefits (listing health 
insurance as most highly prized employee benefit). 
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healthcare coverage through an employer’s group plan than they could on their 
own.111 
The ACA’s enactment in 2010 modified the landscape. The ACA required 
employers with fifty or more full-time employees to provide a certain level of 
affordable health insurance coverage to employees and penalized 
nonconforming employers.112 The ACA also established state health insurance 
marketplaces where individuals could purchase their own health insurance, and 
it required all individuals to have health insurance unless exempted (though this 
“individual mandate” was effectively repealed starting in 2019).113 The ACA 
also provided subsidies in the form of (1) premium tax credits to lower-income 
individuals to subsidize insurance premiums and (2) cost-sharing subsidies paid 
directly from the federal government to insurers to help reduce out-of-pocket 
medical expenses for lower-income households.114 Thus, lower-income workers 
(whether employees or independent contractors) obtaining their own insurance 
from an ACA marketplace might benefit from these subsidies. 
It is possible that the desirability of employer-provided health insurance may 
have declined for some taxpayers who are eligible to receive ACA subsidies.115 
As Professor David Gamage has argued, employer-provided health insurance 
may cause taxpayers to lose ACA subsidies and be worse off as a result, a 
dynamic that may distort work choices as well as employer decisions to provide 
health insurance.116 For our purposes, it should be noted that the availability of 
ACA marketplace insurance plans and subsidies may mean that being an 
employee in order to receive health insurance may have become less important 
for some workers. It remains to be seen whether the repeal of the individual 
 
111 Historically, employers were not required to provide health insurance but might have 
done so to attract or retain workers. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 110 (reporting survey data 
showing potential employees base their decisions of where to work in part on benefits plans 
offered). Health care benefits can help ensure a healthy (and productive) workforce. See 
Workplace Health Promotion: Increase Productivity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/workplacehealthpromotion/model/control-costs/benefits 
/productivity.html [https://perma.cc/EQP5-FX8J] (last updated Dec. 4, 2015). 
112 I.R.C. § 4980H; Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/employer-shared-responsibility-
provisions [https://perma.cc/6QUW-ZYEC] (last updated Feb. 18, 2020). 
113 I.R.C. § 5000A(c). The December 2017 repeal of the ACA individual mandate became 
effective in 2019 and may have reduced the number of individuals without employer-provided 
healthcare who sought out their own coverage. See id. (requiring applicable individuals to 
maintain minimum coverage or face penalty); Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
§ 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(c)) (repealing individual 
mandate); infra note 117 (presenting and discussing early empirical data on repeal). 
114 I.R.C. § 36B (detailing tax credits); 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (detailing cost sharing). 
115 See Gamage, supra note 107, at 702. 
116 Id. at 701-08. 
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mandate will cause ACA-marketplaces to unravel and will diminish ACA health 
insurance availability and, correspondingly, work choices and preferences.117 
b. Retirement Benefits 
Another benefit often associated with employee status is the ability to 
participate in the employer’s retirement plan.118 Both independent contractors 
and employees can access tax-favored retirement-savings vehicles, such as those 
that allow tax-free contributions.119 However, employer-based plans can be 
more attractive on a number of fronts. First, contribution limits for nonemployer 
retirement vehicles are lower than for employer-based plans.120 However, these 
 
117 Recent Census Bureau data show a drop in the percentage of insured individuals in 
2018, but that drop seems primarily driven by a drop in the percentage of individuals covered 
by Medicaid. EDWARD R. BERCHICK, JESSICA C. BARNETT & RACHEL D. UPTON, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018, at 4-5 (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-267.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RP6H-BHEE]. The effects of the repeal of the individual mandate remain 
unclear. An early assessment suggests that the repeal, which took effect January 1, 2019, 
resulted in a 5% decline in enrollment in the first quarter of 2019. Rachel Fehr, Cynthia Cox 
& Larry Levitt, Data Note: Changes in Enrollment in the Individual Health Insurance Market 
Through Early 2019, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/private-
insurance/issue-brief/data-note-changes-in-enrollment-in-the-individual-health-insurance-
market-through-early-2019/ [https://perma.cc/9GU5-VCZP]; Press Release, Kaiser Family 
Found., Enrollment in Individual Market Dips Slightly in Early 2019 After Repeal of 
Individual Mandate Penalty (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/press-
release/enrollment-in-individual-market-dips-slightly-in-early-2019-after-repeal-of-
individual-mandate-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/UP42-P5YP]. 
118 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: 
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2017, at 188 tbl.1 (2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2017/ebbl0061.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CKU-RSVR] 
(reporting that 48% of private sector employers offered retirement plans). The same survey 
found that 66% of private sector workers reported that their employer offered such plans. Id. 
at 191 tbl.2. The 2019 survey reported that 71% of all private industry and state and local 
government workers had access to retirement benefits. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 
2019, at 3 tbl.2 (2019), https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2019/employee-benefits-in-the-
united-states-march-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YTV9-2228]. 
119 Options include I.R.C. § 401(a) qualified plans, § 401(k) plans, § 403(b) plans for tax-
exempt and public-educational organizations, and §§ 219(a) and 408(e) individual retirement 
accounts (“IRAs”). Employer-based retirement plans are governed not only by tax law but 
also by ERISA, which sets minimum parameters on the structure and operation of the plans 
and the conduct of plan fiduciaries. See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.). 
120 For example, the 2020 maximum contribution to a traditional IRA is $57,000. I.R.S. 
Notice 2019-59, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1091. Contributions are deductible by the taxpayer, but the 
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higher limits in employer plans may be less relevant for lower-wage employees 
unlikely to reach the contribution caps. 
Second, employer-based retirement plans may feature lower fees, loan 
options, and, perhaps most significantly, matching employer contributions.121 
While employers are not generally required to provide retirement plans to 
employees, if they do establish such plans and want tax-advantaged treatment, 
they must satisfy a series of nondiscrimination, contribution, and participation 
tests122 which are intended to ensure that the plan is available to lower-wage 
employees and is adequately used by such employees. Thus, retirement plan 
consultants advise firms to decrease the risk of failing the tests by making “plan 
participation more attractive to lower-paid employees” and increasing the plan’s 
matching formula “to encourage [lower-wage employees] to select higher 
payroll deduction rates.”123 In this way, the leverage exercised by highly 
compensated employees who demand retirement benefits forces employers to 
provide these benefits to lower-wage employees as well in order to get the tax 
benefit.124 
 
deduction may be limited if the taxpayer or spouse is covered by an employer plan and their 
income exceeds certain thresholds. IRA Deduction Limits, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/ira-deduction-limits [https://perma.cc/2JLK-8ZNZ] 
(last updated Dec. 20, 2019); see 2020 IRA Contribution and Deduction Limits, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/2018-ira-
contribution-and-deduction-limits-effect-of-modified-agi-on-deductible-contributions-if-
you-are-covered-by-a-retirement-plan-at-work [https://perma.cc/9NFC-EG24] (last updated 
Dec. 4, 2019). The 2020 contribution limit for a 401(k) plan is $19,500. I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, 
supra; see I.R.C. § 415 (2018). 
121 For example, if the employee directs 1% of her salary into the retirement account, the 
employer might match that contribution, resulting in a total contribution equal to 2% of her 
salary. Employer contributions to qualified plans are deductible by the employer (and 
excluded from the employee’s current income). See 401(k) Plan Overview, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-sponsor/401k-plan-overview 
[https://perma.cc/JW8T-SMXV] (last updated Dec. 4, 2019); see also I.R.C. § 404(a). 
122 See 401(k) Plan Fix-It Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov 
/retirement-plans/401k-plan-fix-it-guide-the-plan-failed-the-401k-adp-and-acp-
nondiscrimination-tests [https://perma.cc/T3XU-SMYK] (last updated Dec. 19, 2019). 
123 Scott McCarthy, What Is Non-Discrimination Testing?, PENTEGRA (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.pentegra.com/current-thinking/fee-disclosure/non-discrimination-testing/ 
[https://perma.cc/ND35-MRPV]. 
124 Participation rates in employer-sponsored plans are considerably higher, primarily 
because the money is automatically taken out of one’s paycheck and because, under some 
circumstances, employers are also permitted to autoenroll employees with the option to opt 
out. See Barbara A. Butrica & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic Enrollment, Employer 
Match Rates, and Employee Compensation in 401(k) Plans, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2015, 
at 1, 3. Some states have explored pilot projects to mimic the advantages of automatic 
employer plans through the introduction of “auto-IRAs.” See Elizabeth Bauer, Should Poor 
People Save for Retirement?, FORBES (July 21, 2018, 1:46 PM), 
  
2020] TAX LAW’S WORKPLACE SHIFT 679 
 
The above discussion illustrates that—even putting aside the 2017 tax 
changes—the tax consequences of worker classification are mixed, but likely 
tilted in favor of independent contractor classification for at least some workers. 
Independent contractors can take more generous above-the-line deductions for 
business expenses than employees and are not subject to FUTA taxes.125 And 
the availability of ACA healthcare subsidies and exchange plans has arguably 
helped alleviate the burdens of obtaining health insurance for oneself. With the 
introduction of § 199A, the worry is that the incentive to prefer (or accept) 
independent contractor classification over employee classification has become 
even stronger. 
Cutting the other way, independent contractors arguably have more onerous 
tax-compliance responsibilities, including being responsible for remitting 
income, Social Security, and Medicare tax payments; tracking expenses; and 
paying estimated taxes. Retirement benefits and incentives are likely less 
favorable for independent contractors as well. These downsides, together with 
the fact that employee status clearly provides more robust labor- and 
employment-law protections despite being more expensive for employers, might 
cause some to prefer employee status instead. 
B. The Legal Tests: A Contested Landscape 
Of course, it is not enough to simply prefer one classification to the other. 
This Section explains various fields’ legal tests that hiring firms and workers 
must meet to qualify for their preferred statuses. In determining worker 
classification, different legal regimes utilize distinct tests set forth in case law, 
regulations, and rulings. The criteria and conclusions of one legal field are not 
generally dispositive for others.126 Thus, the same work relationship may require 
multiple analyses across settings. For example, a Florida court considering the 
classification of workers under state labor law would not be bound by a federal 
tax-law conclusion that the same worker was an independent contractor.127 Nor 
are conclusions in the same field even binding across jurisdictions. A California 
 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2018/07/21/should-poor-people-save-for-retirement/ 
[https://perma.cc/YD68-MD2V] (“Five states are launching plans to automatically enroll 
employees, predominantly lower-income workers, in state-administered individual retirement 
accounts.” (quoting Andrew G. Biggs, Opinion, State-Run Retirement Plans Are the Wrong 
Way to Protect the Poor, WASH. POST (July 18, 2018, 5:38 PM), https://www.washington 
post.com/opinions/state-run-retirement-plans-are-the-wrong-way-to-protect-the-
poor/2018/07/18/636b3eea-8a0c-11e8-a345-a1bf7847b375_story.html)). 
125 I.R.C. § 62. 
126 See, e.g., Clement L. Hyland & Laura A. Quigley, Note, Determination of Employee 
Status: Right to Control v. Economic Reality—Is There a Difference?, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1987, at 
43, 44 (discussing differences). 
127 See, e.g., Susan Schwochau, Note, Identifying an Independent Contractor for Tax 
Purposes: Can Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163, 174-85 (1998) 
(discussing tax test). 
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state-law determination will not bind those working for the same company in, 
say, New York.128  
1. Common Law Agency, Economic Realities, and ABC Tests 
While the NLRA and the FLSA are both foundational pieces of worker-
protection legislation, they apply different tests in determining worker status.129  
Under the NLRA, courts have applied the common law agency test in 
determining worker classification.130 Based on common law respondeat superior 
claims currently found in the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the common law 
agency test examines the employer’s control or right of control over the manner 
and means by which the work is accomplished.131 In applying this common law 
 
128 See, e.g., Independent Contractor Versus Employee, ST. CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20191206132018/https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independent
contractor.htm [https://perma.cc/G5LL-4BR7] (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) (“[I]n a wage claim 
where employment status is an issue, DLSE will often use the five-prong economic realities 
test to decide the issue. However, in a separate matter before a different state agency with the 
same parties and same facts, and employment status again being an issue, that agency may be 
required to use a different test, for example, the ‘control test,’ which may result in a different 
determination. Thus, it is possible that the same individual will be considered an employee 
for purposes of one law and an independent contractor under another.”). 
129 For example, the Acts have different statutory exclusions of certain employees. See 
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728 & n.7 (1947) (noting FLSA’s failure 
to provide explicit statutory definition of “employee”); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 
U.S. 111, 120 (1944) (commenting on Congress’s failure to define “employee” in NLRA 
when enacted), abrogated by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992). 
130 The Supreme Court initially offered an NLRA test for worker classification that was 
broader than the common law agency test, but subsequent statutory reform clarified 
congressional intent to rely on the common law test. Nationwide Mut., 503 U.S. at 324-25 
(“In each case, the Court read ‘employee,’ which neither statute helpfully defined, to imply 
something broader than the common-law definition; after each opinion, Congress amended 
the statute so construed to demonstrate that the usual common-law principles were the keys 
to meaning.” (footnote omitted)). 
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n 
employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and 
means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”); Oei, supra note 58, at 121-22 (discussing 
common law agency test); see also Nationwide Mut., 503 U.S. at 323 (using common law 
right-to-control test for ERISA claims); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 
F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2014) (using control test and other factors to conclude that FedEx 
drivers were employees under California Labor Code); cf. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 
563 F.3d 492, 498-500 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying “significant entrepreneurial opportunity” 
analysis to FedEx drivers); Robert L. Redfearn III, Sharing Economy Misclassification: 
Employees and Independent Contractors in Transportation Network Companies, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1035 (2016) (“The primary question in determining if an 
employment relationship exists is ‘whether the person to whom service is rendered has the 
right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.’” (quoting S.G. 
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test, courts and tribunals have generally applied a list of eleven to thirteen factors 
to determine control, including the skill required; the location of the work; the 
individual or entity that provides the tools, instrumentalities, and place of work; 
the duration of the work relationship; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; and the inclusion of the work done by the 
worker in the regular business of the employer.132  
However, although it is generally acknowledged that the common law test 
applies for NLRA purposes, exactly what the test requires is contested. In particular, 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) have sparred over how 
important it is that the worker has “significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain 
or loss” (which suggests independent contractor status).133 In 2009, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB134 that FedEx drivers were 
independent contractors because of evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity.135 But 
in 2014, the NLRB rejected the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation and its focus on 
theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity as decisive. Instead, the NLRB 
emphasized control over the worker and actual entrepreneurial opportunity and 
applied a revised version of the test.136 In 2019, the NLRB again revised its test 
in SuperShuttle DFW, Inc.,137 ruling instead that the focus should be on 
theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity available to the worker.138 This position 
makes it easier to classify workers as independent contractors. 
To determine employee status under the FLSA, by contrast, the Department 
of Labor and courts have adopted an “economic realities” test that examines 
whether the worker is economically dependent on the business for which she 
works or is in reality in business herself.139 Courts do not use the common law 
 
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (in bank))); 
Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 487 n.48 (2016) (describing factors under California multifactor 
test, which draws on both common law test and FLSA economic realities test). 
132 Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB, 822 F.3d 563, 565-66 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(describing multifactor employee-status test); N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 
599-600 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (using multifactor right-to-control test to determine employee 
status). 
133 FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 497 (quoting Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 
292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
134 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
135 Id. at 500. 
136 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610, 612 (2014) (“[W]e do not share the view of 
the District of Columbia Circuit that, over time, the Board has come to treat entrepreneurial 
opportunity as the decisive factor in its inquiry.”), enforcement denied, 849 F.3d 1123 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017), and overruled by 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
137 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
138 See id. at 9-10 (overruling FedEx Home Delivery). 
139 See Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2006) (listing six 
factors of economic realities test); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT 
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control test for FLSA purposes because the FLSA defines the term “employ” to 
“include[] to suffer or permit to work,” thus covering a broader set of 
relationships than the common law test.140 Like the common law test, the 
economic realities test also weighs a list of factors, including whether the work 
is integral to the employer’s business, whether the worker’s managerial skill 
enhances her opportunity for profit, how the worker’s relative investment in 
facilities and equipment compares to the employer’s, the amount of special skill 
required for the work, the permanence of the relationship, and the degree of 
control exercised by the hiring firm over how the work is performed.141 And like 
the common law test, the boundaries of the FLSA economic realities test are 
contested, with administrative-level policy interpretive guidance making it 
easier or more difficult to classify workers in a certain way.142  
State unemployment insurance regimes have also developed and adopted their 
own classification tests. A majority of states apply the “ABC” test in their 
analyses.143 The ABC test considers (A) whether the worker is free from control 
or direction in performing the work; (B) whether the work is conducted outside 
the ordinary course of the business’s activities and off the business’s premises; 
and (C) whether the worker is customarily engaged in an independent trade, 
profession, or business.144 Other states use modifications of the ABC test, use 
the right-to-control test, or rely on state common law.  
 
RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) 1 (2008), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/S37X-QJR5] 
(defining employee as “one who, as a matter of economic reality, follows the usual path of an 
employee and is dependent on the business which he or she serves”); see also Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that FLSA meaning of “employee” 
might reach workers “who might not qualify as [employees] under a strict application of 
traditional agency law principles”); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947) 
(suggesting five factors to consider in assessing employee status under Social Security Act), 
abrogated by Nationwide Mut., 503 U.S. at 325; Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Essay, 
Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1528-32 (2016) (examining 
similarities between tests under FLSA and California Labor Code). 
140 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018). 
141 See Independent Contractor Versus Employee, supra note 128; supra note 139 and 
accompanying sources. 
142 On June 7, 2017, the U.S. Secretary of Labor withdrew the Department of Labor’s two-
year-old, informal worker classification guidance documents that outlined the economic 
realities test and broadly interpreted it. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Secretary of 
Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent Contractor Informal Guidance (June 7, 
2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607 [https://perma.cc/M4PS-
XER5]. This makes it easier to classify workers as independent contractors. 
143 Oei, supra note 58, at 122. 
144 Id.; see Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 458-59 (N.J. 2015) (applying ABC 
test to New Jersey wage-payment and wage-and-hour claims). 
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The NLRA, the FLSA, and state unemployment insurance regimes are just 
three key examples of areas of law in which worker classification matters but 
different tests are used. Worker classification also matters in other legal regimes 
as well, including ERISA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, among others.145 These regimes all have to distinguish 
independent contractors from employees, and they all make their own 
determinations regarding which test to apply.146 However, the differences in 
tests among regimes should not be overstated. In some cases, different tests 
might lead to different outcomes, but in many other cases the tests point in the 
same direction. 
2. Tax Law’s Twenty-Factor Test 
Tax law employs a twenty-factor test set forth in IRS Revenue Ruling 87-41 
to distinguish independent contractors from employees.147 The test incorporates 
a mix of behavioral, financial, and relational factors.148 Broadly speaking, the 
 
145 See supra Section II.A. 
146 See Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?, supra note 5, at 74 fig.1 (charting tests across 
regimes). 
147 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298-99 (detailing test’s twenty factors); Shu-Yi Oei 
& Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1020 (2016) (“[C]ourts 
have considered a number of these factors in classifying workers.”); see, e.g., Schramm v. 
Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 233, 234-35 (2011) (considering eight factors to determine 
worker status); Levine v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1063, 1066-67 (2005) (listing factors 
used to determine worker status). The potential indeterminacy of the twenty-factor test led to 
reform proposals. See, e.g., William Hoffman, Congress Presses IRS to Boost Gig Economy 
Compliance, 160 TAX NOTES 740, 740-41 (2018) (outlining recommendations to lower third-
party reporting thresholds); Calvin H. Johnson, Settle Withholding by the Dollars, Not 
Control, 136 TAX NOTES 949, 956-58 (2012) (advocating withholding income tax at source 
regardless of worker classification). 
148 Oei, supra note 58, at 122 (“The twenty factors focus on behavioral controls, financial 
aspects of the job, and the nature of the relationship between worker and hirer.”); Independent 
Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov 
/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-
employee [https://perma.cc/4LLH-78J4] (last updated Jan. 16, 2020). The factors include 
(1) whether the person for whom the services are performed has the right to require 
compliance with that person’s instructions; (2) whether there is worker training; (3) whether 
the worker’s services are integrated into business operations; (4) whether services must be 
personally rendered; (5) whether the person for whom the services are performed hires 
assistants; (6) whether there is a continuing relationship; (7) whether set hours are established; 
(8) whether full-time work is required; (9) whether the work must be done on the employer’s 
premises; (10) whether the work must be performed in a particular sequence; (11) whether 
the worker must submit regular reports; (12) whether the worker is paid by the hour, week, or 
month; (13) whether the person for whom the services are performed ordinarily pays for the 
worker’s business or traveling expenses; (14) whether the person for whom the services are 
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factors are concerned with reporting structure, provision of training and 
guidance, level of investment, and client base. These twenty factors are actually 
a distillation of years of common law and reflect the adoption of the common 
law control test for federal employment tax purposes (and the rejection of the 
economic realities test).149 
Importantly, the multifactor tax test does not include any presumption in favor 
of either employee or independent contractor status.150 Instead, the test aims to 
result in a neutral determination that reflects the totality of the factors.151 
However, some factors are given more weight than others.152 On balance, a 
worker is typically classified as an independent contractor for tax law purposes 
if the person for whom the work is performed controls only the results of the 
work and not the details of its execution.153 
 
performed furnishes significant tools, materials, or equipment; (15) whether the worker 
invests in facilities used in performance of services that are not furnished by the employer 
(suggestive of independent contractor status); (16) whether the worker can realize profit or 
loss; (17) whether the worker works for more than one firm at the same time; (18) whether 
the worker makes her services available to the general public; (19) whether there is a right to 
discharge the worker; and (20) whether the worker can terminate the relationship at any time 
without incurring liability (indicating employee status). Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 
298-99; see Diane M. Ring, Silos and First Movers in the Sharing Economy Debates, 13 LAW 
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 61, 67 n.12 (2019) (summarizing factors). 
149 See generally WILLIAM HAYS WEISSMAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX REPORTING & PROF’L 
MGMT., SECTION 530: ITS HISTORY AND APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL DEFINITION OF 
THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES (2009), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/irpac-br_530_relief_-_appendix_natrm_paper_09032009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QBD3-FG5W]. 
150 Ring, supra note 148, at 68. 
151 Id. (“[T]he expectation is that the classification will be the result of direct application 
of the multiple factors, though in a fact-intensive and messy way.”). 
152 WEISSMAN, supra note 149, at 4-5 (“While these 20 factors are commonly relied upon, 
it is not an exhaustive list and other factors may be relevant. Further, some factors may be 
given more weight than others in a particular case.”). 
153 See, e.g., Schramm v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 233, 235 (2011) (“The degree of 
control that the principal exercises over the worker has been referred to as the crucial test in 
making the determination.”); Levine v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1063, 1067 (2005) (“If 
the person receiving the benefit of a service has the right to control the manner in which the 
service is performed, the person rendering the service may be an employee.”); Rev. Rul. 
87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298 (“As an aid to determining whether an individual is an employee 
under the common law rules, twenty factors or elements have been identified as indicating 
whether sufficient control is present to establish an employer-employee relationship.”); Oei 
& Ring, supra note 147, at 1021 (“Very generally, a worker is an independent contractor if 
the business paying the worker has the right to control or direct only the result of the work 
and not what will be done and how.”); Independent Contractor Defined, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-
contractor-defined [https://perma.cc/V68X-YSE3] (last updated Jan. 23, 2020) (“What 
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While, as a formal matter, each field makes its own worker classification 
determination, there are limits on whether a taxpayer can assert employee status 
for purposes of one legal regime and independent contractor status for 
another.154 As we detail in other work, although the fields make nominally 
independent decisions, the choices and outcomes in one legal field are likely to 
influence outcomes in another legal field.155 It is therefore uncommon to observe 
attempts at arbitrage between fields in classification matters—that is, attempts 
to argue that workers are, say, independent contractors for tax purposes but 
employees for labor-law purposes.  
In summary, the above discussion yields two key insights:  
First, a series of legal tests needs to be satisfied in each field in order to 
plausibly make the case that a worker is an independent contractor or an 
employee. Firms or workers cannot simply choose their preferred classification 
while meeting no requirements. Moreover, these legal tests are contested and 
evolving. Decisions by courts and administrative bodies may make it easier or 
more difficult in a particular field to classify workers as independent contractors 
and may change results in close cases. 
Second, while these tests are distinct across fields, attempting cross-field 
arbitrage is risky and not a strategy usually observed. The more common 
dynamic is for firms and workers to pick a consistent classification in a relatively 
coordinated fashion across fields. 
C. Decisional Trade-Offs and the Mechanics of a Shift 
Thus, even prior to the 2017 tax reform, a decisional dynamic long existed 
whereby hiring firms and workers confronted trade-offs between independent 
contractor and employee status and sometimes held conflicting preferences. 
Assessing these trade-offs requires consideration of labor and employment 
protections as well as tax outcomes. Independent contractor status might be 
attractive for some workers due to some tax advantages and the flexibility of 
being one’s own boss, and it is undoubtedly attractive for hiring firms due to 
lower costs. By contrast, employee status provides more direct protections and 
fewer tax-compliance costs for workers but might come with tax drawbacks and 
 
matters is that the employer has the legal right to control the details of how the services are 
performed.”). 
154 See Oei, supra note 58, at 122; Ring, supra note 148, at 66 (“Thus, while the legal 
system is not bound to a universal standard across all fields, in practice the basic structure of 
the rules has generally converged.”); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Senate Tax Bill and 
the Battles over Worker Classification, TAXPROF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/11/the-senate-tax-bill-and-worker-
classification.html [https://perma.cc/MX74-4MAU] (arguing that siloed approaches may 
have prevented tax scholars from fully appreciating risks of NEW GIG Act’s safe harbor). 
155 See Oei, supra note 58, at 122. 
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is likely more costly for firms. As a result, the decisional trade-off might look 
different for workers and firms.  
Here, we map how the decisional trade-offs for workers and firms would 
generally look when considering the tax-, labor-, and employment-law 
consequences of choosing a certain classification.156 We then examine the 
mechanisms by which the introduction of a new 20% deduction might change 
that trade-off and lead to a shift. 
1. The Decisional Trade-Off: Workers vs. Firms  
a. Workers 
The key decision for workers is to weigh the possibility of more money 
upfront due to more generous tax deductions for independent contractors against 
direct labor and employment protections for employees. At first blush, this 
resembles a classic direct-versus-trickle-down decision: Should the worker take 
the direct protections of labor law, or should she “go it alone” and potentially 
receive more dollars, which she can use to self-insure?  
But there are other layers to the trade-off. For example, another consideration 
is how to weigh the possibility that the job disappears (whether through 
automation or offshoring)157 or that wages fall. Conversely, workers might 
weigh the possibility that remuneration may be higher for independent 
contractors due to lower costs for the hiring firms. The calculus may also vary 
based on whether the worker already holds another main job as an employee that 
provides benefits or is able to self-insure using other means.158 A worker with 
other full-time employment (or with a spouse with full-time employment) may 
be more willing to risk the loss of the secondary job, thereby being willing to 
take the risk that employee classification makes that job disappear. But on the 
flip side, a worker may instead prefer independent contractor status for the 
secondary job on the theory that she already receives health, retirement, and 
other protections from her primary job.159 Also, a worker who has ample wealth 
or other resources may be less interested in the direct protections of employee 
classification. Finally, for some, the expressive advantages of flexibility and 
“being your own boss” may make independent contractor status preferable 
despite forgone protections. 
 
156 Ultimately, the classification decision would depend on broader market and economic 
factors as well. See infra Part III. 
157 See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of job elimination 
due to offshoring and increasing automation). 
158 See infra Section IV.B.2 (considering variously situated classes of workers and 
concluding that each class’s response to § 199A will vary based on divergent incentives and 
preferences). 
159 A worker with a full-time-employee job may have healthcare and retirement benefits 
through that job and may be able to increase tax withholding on wages from that job to cover 
any required quarterly filing and payment obligations on income earned from secondary 
independent contractor positions. 
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An important question here is the extent to which workers consciously 
appraise the costs and benefits of alternative choices. The monetary value of 
salary and benefits can certainly be estimated, though how this changes when 
classification shifts may be harder to divine. But the value of other benefits, such 
as worker independence or benefits under the NLRA, the FLSA, or state labor 
laws, may be hard to quantify. This is particularly so once on-the-ground 
enforcement considerations and worker bargaining power are taken into 
account. It is possible that some workers may cognitively discount the value of 
direct benefits—some of which may become salient only in the future—while 
overappreciating direct dollars received. But it is also possible that the tax 
advantages and disadvantages are not immediately obvious to workers either. 
b. Hiring Firms 
From the hiring firm’s perspective, on the other hand, the traditional 
preference has been to classify workers as independent contractors if business 
structure and market conditions permit. This reflects the existence of significant 
tax and nontax costs of employee classification. On the tax side, businesses are 
obligated to pay the employer portion of FICA taxes and FUTA taxes, and they 
must also handle the administrative burdens of tax reporting and withholding for 
employees.160 On the nontax side, employers must satisfy various requirements 
regarding permitted wages, hours, working conditions, and benefits that do not 
apply to independent contractors. Not surprisingly, many businesses would 
gladly eliminate these costs and burdens. 
But to do so comes at a price. First, to support the claimed classification, the 
work relationship must satisfy the test in the relevant field. Broadly speaking, a 
business looking to embrace independent contractor classification for its 
workers must relinquish significant control over the workers. The more control 
the business exercises, the less likely it is that independent contractor 
classification will be respected. In fact, firms have historically undertaken 
measures to “lose” control over workers, at least on paper—for example, by 
engaging in subcontracting relationships that formally show diminished 
control.161 
 
160 See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing FICA and FUTA taxes). 
161 “Subcontracting” denotes moving employees (e.g., a cleaning crew) off the company’s 
payroll onto the payroll of a separate business and then outsourcing the cleaning contract to 
the separate business. The workers may still be employees but are now employees of the 
separate business. The advantages are that fewer benefits need to be offered to these workers 
(due to a reduced need to match benefits offered to other employees of the original firm) and 
that the liable employer in the event of disputes is less well-known and has shallower pockets. 
See Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 379 (2008) 
(“Outsourcing employees to labor intermediaries such as temporary or leasing firms or labor 
brokers allows companies to argue that the intermediate entity is the sole employer 
responsible for pay rules, and allows them to dodge responsibility.”). 
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The question for many firms, then, is whether there is a segment of the 
workforce that can plausibly be moved out of employee status and into 
independent contractor status while still satisfying the core needs of the 
business.162 The answer will depend on the specifics of the work relationship, 
the hiring firm’s willingness to risk misclassification penalties, and the relevant 
legal tests and their contested and evolving interpretations by courts and 
tribunals. 
In some cases, firms have affirmatively concluded that their business model 
requires retention of control over workers and classification of workers as 
employees. For example, platform business Hello Alfred, which provides 
personal home managers who handle an assortment of household tasks, recently 
decided to rely exclusively on a workforce of employees despite the trend among 
platform firms to classify similar workers as independent contractors.163 
Notwithstanding the additional costs of employee classification, Hello Alfred 
concluded that exercising only limited control over its workforce in order to 
classify its workers as independent contractors was inconsistent with its business 
model, which was to provide carefully screened home managers to clients. 
2. The Mechanics of a Workplace Shift 
With the introduction of a 20% deduction for independent contractors, several 
outcomes are possible: (1) workers who are currently employees could abandon 
their employee jobs and do independent contractor jobs instead, (2) workers who 
are currently employees could try to recharacterize their current jobs as 
independent contractor work, or (3) firms could convert employee jobs into 
independent contractor jobs.164 The first scenario lies in the hands of the worker. 
To accomplish the second scenario, hiring employers would have to cooperate 
because decisions such as choosing which tax form to issue, determining 
whether to withhold, and deciding how much control over workers to cede 
would rest with the hiring firm. The second scenario would also require that 
firms and workers satisfy the relevant legal tests165 and avoid the rebuttable 
presumption in the § 199A regulations that former employees who shift to 
independent contractor status are still employees.166 
The third possible pathway envisions that hiring firms that had previously 
viewed the costs of reorganizing and reclassifying their workers as independent 
 
162 A related question is whether alternative strategies, such as subcontracting, are 
available. 
163 Marcela Sapone, Working on Work, HELLO ALFRED (July 22, 2016), 
https://blog.helloalfred.com/working-on-work-819e1e2aa6db [https://perma.cc/9XJA-
SZGX] (“When we launched last year, we decided to challenge the on-demand industry norm 
and W-2 our employees . . . .”). 
164 See supra Section I.B (noting concerns about these types of shifts). 
165 See supra Section II.B (describing legal tests that apply in various fields). 
166 Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3)(i) (2019). 
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contractors as too high could be enticed by the new § 199A deduction and decide 
to unilaterally shift workers to independent contractor status. This could cause 
workers to involuntarily shift to independent contractor status as employee 
positions disappear. 
But it is the worker who takes the § 199A deduction, not the firm. Why, then, 
might a hiring firm decide to reclassify workers (or help workers reclassify 
themselves) after § 199A? One possible scenario is as follows: suppose that in a 
pre-§ 199A world, a firm would like to reclassify its current employees as 
independent contractors to reduce costs (including tax and nontax legal costs). 
However, doing so would place the full burden of paying payroll taxes on the 
worker,167 and the firm is unwilling to fully compensate the worker for the 
“employer portion” of the payroll taxes that the worker would now have to pay 
herself (7.65% of self-employment income and 1.45% for the Medicare tax, in 
addition to the employee’s half).168 Assume additionally that there is a nontrivial 
risk that the workforce might either quit or challenge the independent contractor 
classification. Moreover, the firm must incur some costs in rearranging 
operations to meet the legal tests for independent contractor status, lest it risk 
misclassification penalties. Given these factors, the firm concludes that shifting 
does not make sense. 
Now comes § 199A, offering qualifying nonemployee workers a 20% 
deduction. That firm could now create a neutral or favorable tax outcome for 
workers by increasing worker pay by something less than the employer’s 
savings from independent contractor reclassification. This is possible because 
the 20% of QBI deduction serves as a subsidy from the government which 
allows the employer to provide a smaller pay increase. Under these facts, the 
marginal firm might now find reclassification worthwhile. Even if workers 
demand a pay bump equal to the full employer portion of the payroll taxes, the 
firm might still find the shift advantageous because workers (with the new 
deduction) are unlikely to challenge their new classifications.169 In short, new 
§ 199A may act as a monetary kicker and may serve a pacifying function on 
workers, thereby encouraging firms to make the shift even if the actual deduction 
goes to the worker. 
Ultimately, of course, whether workers decide to seek or accept independent 
contractor classification and whether firms help facilitate such reclassification 
or foist it on workers will depend on factors such as the nature of the work, the 
elasticity of labor supply and demand in the industry, the relative bargaining 
power of workers and firms, the risk tolerance of firms, and other business 
 
167 See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing payroll taxes). 
168 This basic hypothetical assumes that the hiring firm does not offer healthcare or 
retirement benefits, so workers do not price in these factors. 
169 That is, if the employer increased worker pay by the full amount of the employer portion 
of payroll taxes, then this should make the worker neutral between the two statuses. With the 
addition of § 199A, that worker would also get the 20% deduction at no cost to the firm and 
might be even more satisfied. 
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realities. In addition, as Part III explains, there are a number of interlocking legal 
and economic considerations that may either limit or exacerbate a workplace 
shift.  
III. BROADENING THE ANALYSIS ON A WORKPLACE SHIFT 
We now broaden the analysis beyond tax law and § 199A to show how tax 
law interacts with other factors to ultimately shape contemporary work 
arrangements. The takeaways from our analysis are that (1) there are limiting 
factors—both internal and external to § 199A—that may reduce the extent of a 
workplace shift and that (2) there are other exacerbating factors that might make 
the shift more extreme. Tax is only one variable in this confluence of factors, so 
it is difficult to isolate the extent to which § 199A is a driver of a workplace 
shift.  
A. Factors That May Limit the Shift 
We first discuss the factors that might limit the extent of a § 199A-induced 
workplace shift. 
1. The Limits of § 199A 
Internal Statutory Guardrails. As discussed, § 199A comes with statutory 
limitations and guardrails. Most pertinently, the line-of-business and wage-and-
investment limitations discussed above may reduce or eliminate the availability 
of the deduction for workers whose incomes are above certain statutory 
thresholds.170 Businesses in prohibited fields or that lack sufficient W-2 wages 
paid and/or qualified depreciable property investments may be limited in their 
ability to take the deduction. Thus, certain higher-income taxpayers may not 
qualify for the benefits of § 199A unless they substantively reorganize their 
operations. While it is possible that § 199A may influence businesses to make 
organizational and structuring changes to become eligible for the deduction, 
such changes may be costly and deter classification shifts. On the other hand, 
final regulations confirm that the “reasonable compensation” guardrail will not 
apply to independent contractors and hence cannot be relied upon to constrain a 
workplace shift.171 
Conflicting Incentives Within § 199A. There are also parts of § 199A that 
might make it more attractive to hire employees than independent contractors. 
For example, higher-income pass-through businesses (whose owners, either 
partners or S-corporation shareholders, are seeking their own § 199A 
deductions) must consider the 50%-of-W-2-wage limitation and/or the wage-
 
170 I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2), (d) (2018). IRS regulations state that the reasonable-compensation 
guardrail applies only to S-corporation shareholders and not to independent contractors or 
partners. See Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(H). 
171 Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-3(b)(2)(ii)(H). 
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and-qualified-property-investment limitation.172 If the business does not pay 
sufficient W-2 wages (or a sufficient combination of wages plus qualified 
property), the pass-through business owners’ § 199A deduction may be limited. 
Thus, the traditional business preference for independent contractor 
classification must now compete with the need to pay adequate W-2 wages in 
order to take the § 199A deduction.  
Relatedly, for pass-through businesses organized as partnerships, there may 
be conflicting incentives among partners. Strategies designed to ensure 
compliance with § 199A, such as a plan to hire sufficient employees (rather than 
subcontracting) to increase the amount of W-2 wages paid, may be appealing to 
owners who are concerned about the 50%-of-W-2-wages limitation. But other 
owners may weigh the need to pay W-2 wages differently (e.g., if they are below 
the income threshold triggering the W-2 rule, if they have losses from other 
qualified businesses that can be used to offset income, or if they are more 
worried about nontax risks and liabilities than are other owners). These types of 
conflicts can be difficult to navigate and predict, particularly in the case of 
existing entities whose owners have heterogeneous preferences.  
Not a Safe Harbor. Another important point is that § 199A is not a risk-free 
safe harbor; it does not guarantee that the classification that the hiring firm 
asserts is the correct one if certain conditions are met. In this regard, § 199A 
differs in design from the NEW GIG Act, a piece of legislation originally 
proposed in 2017 (but ultimately not enacted) that would have almost guaranteed 
risk-free classification upon satisfying three easy statutory conditions.173 While 
the purported goal was to provide workers clarity and “peace of mind” that the 
IRS would not later reclassify them as employees,174 in actuality the safe harbor 
 
172 I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2)(B). 
173 Representative Tom Rice (R-S.C.) introduced the NEW GIG Act in the House in 
October 2017. H.R. 4165, 115th Cong. (2017). Senator John Thune (R-S.D.) introduced the 
NEW GIG Act in the Senate in July 2017. S. 1549, 115th Cong. (2017). This language was 
included in the Chairman’s Mark of the Senate version of the 2017 tax legislation. STAFF OF 
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX 
CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 155-59 (Comm. Print 2017). However, the Act was dropped from the 
final legislation. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE 
CHAIRMAN’S MODIFICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 2 
(Comm. Print 2017). Both congressmen later reintroduced the legislation in their respective 
chambers in March 2019. Press Release, John Thune, Senator, U.S. Senate, Thune 
Reintroduces Bill to Add Certainty to Worker Classification Rules (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/thune-reintroduces-bill-to-add-
certainty-to-worker-classification-rules [https://perma.cc/A92U-56YD]. 
174 Press Release, John Thune, Senator, U.S. Senate, Thune Introduces Bill to Add 
Certainty to Worker Classification Rules (July 13, 2017), https://www.thune.senate.gov 
/public/index.cfm/2017/7/thune-introduces-bill-to-add-certainty-to-worker-classification-
rules [https://perma.cc/YE86-4R72] (“My legislation would provide clear rules so these 
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would have virtually eliminated tax-classification disputes brought by workers. 
The NEW GIG Act did not make independent contractor status more attractive 
to workers; it simply made it less risky for businesses.175 
By contrast, any influence exerted by § 199A will be through reduction in 
workers’ taxes and not by risk reduction for hiring firms themselves. As we have 
argued elsewhere, “the Section 199A nudge to independent classification status 
is wrapped up in the carrot of a 20% deduction.”176 Section 199A is a complex 
carrot177 and the question is whether and under what circumstances this carrot 
will prove sufficient to produce a notable worker classification shift. While the 
carrot may encourage additional shifts in worker classification, there is some 
evidence that many jobs that could be shifted already have been and, moreover, 
that misclassification is widespread.178 Thus, it is also possible that only limited 
further shifts will occur.179 
Complexity and Compliance Costs. Section 199A’s complexity may also 
influence its impact. The statute raises questions regarding the calculation of 
income, the exclusion of certain taxpayers, and the permissibility of strategic 
restructuring of partnerships and other businesses to qualify for the deduction.180 
 
freelance-style workers can work as independent contractors with the peace of mind that their 
tax status will be respected by the IRS.”). 
175 See supra Section II.C (discussing decisional trade-offs between independent 
contractor status and employee status for hiring firms and workers). 
176 Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Is New Code Section 199A Really Going to Turn Us All 
into Independent Contractors? 2 (Jan. 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3101180 [https://perma.cc/MB7G-2U45]. 
177 See, e.g., Scheiber, supra note 22, at B1 (describing negative implications of being 
classified as independent contractor despite purported carrot offered by tax law). 
178 See AUGUSTA R. COOK ET AL., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 
EMPLOYERS DO NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WORKER 
DETERMINATION RULINGS 1 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports 
/201330058fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5KU-RR95] (“The misclassification of employees as 
independent contractors is a nationwide problem affecting millions of workers that continues 
to grow and contribute to the Tax Gap.”); Rubinstein, supra note 56, at 606 (discussing 
misclassification of workers and how courts deal with “quasi-employers”); Lalith de Silva et 
al., Planmatics, Inc., Independent Contractors: Prevalence and Implications for 
Unemployment Insurance Programs 38-51 (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/P35H-2XXS] (profiling four 
industries with higher-than-average use of independent contractors). 
179 See Oei & Ring, supra note 176, at 7 (concluding that shifts in workplace arrangements 
and worker classifications already underway leave open question of § 199A’s ability to 
accelerate shifts). 
180 E.g., Eric Yauch, OMB Review of Passthrough Deduction Regs Is Underway, 160 TAX 
NOTES 707, 707 (2018) (“[H]ow the IRS will implement the deduction has been a hot topic 
among practitioners.”). The Joint Committee on Taxation’s table on distribution of § 199A 
tax benefits reveals that while taxpayers earning from $50,000 to $100,000 will receive $2.8 
billion in benefits from § 199A in 2024, taxpayers with incomes from $500,000 to $1 million 
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This complexity introduces both planning opportunities181 and compliance costs. 
These compliance costs will likely vary by taxpayer.182 For taxpayers already 
classified as independent contractors with incomes below the threshold (and 
who are thus not subject to various statutory limitations), the deduction may be 
relatively straightforward.183 For taxpayers currently classified as employees 
who are considering whether to shift, either at their own initiative or at the behest 
of their employer, the calculus requires them to compare their current tax 
position with that of an independent contractor under the new tax regime and 
assess the risks and costs of shifting.  
For many businesses, the likely effects of § 199A may still be unknown. A 
National Federation of Independent Business survey of more than 2500 small 
businesses184 conducted from February through April 2018 found that 33.4% of 
respondents reported being “not at all familiar” with the new deduction, while 
39.9% reported being “somewhat familiar.”185 Relatedly, 56.3% of respondents 
reported that they have not “talked with a tax professional or advisor to discuss 
 
will receive $36.9 billion in tax benefits. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., 
TABLES RELATED TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2026, at 4 
(Comm. Print 2018). 
181 Sophisticated taxpayers will strategize to secure or maximize their § 199A deduction. 
See, e.g., Ruth Simon & Richard Rubin, Crack and Pack: Companies Try to Master New Tax 
Law, WALL STREET J., Apr. 4, 2018, at A1 (outlining strategies such as cleaving partnerships 
engaged in disqualified professions, like healthcare or law, into qualified and nonqualified 
activities). The IRS has begun responding to some of these strategies. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.199A-5(c)(2) (2019) (limiting cleaving of businesses by treating businesses that provide 
services to 50%-related party as SSTBs). 
182 See WILLIAM G. GALE ET AL., URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., EFFECTS OF THE 
TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 17 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu 
/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4K7C-T4N9] (noting that 2017 tax reform “will end up making taxes more 
complicated on net for many taxpayers” due in part to taxpayer efforts to “figure out how to 
organize their employment status and business affairs to qualify for the 20 percent pass-
through deduction”). 
183 Cf. Martin A. Sullivan, A Dozen Ways to Increase the TCJA Passthrough Benefits, 159 
TAX NOTES 147, 148-53 (2018) (detailing complexities of § 199A for some taxpayers). See 
SCOTT GREENBERG & NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., REFORMING THE PASS-THROUGH 
DEDUCTION 13 (Rachel Shuster ed., 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180621095652 
/Tax-Foundation-FF593.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CNM-L3VK] (characterizing compliance for 
such taxpayers as “relatively simple”). 
184 Only 16.5% of survey respondents were C corporations, ineligible for the § 199A 
deduction. NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS. RESEARCH CTR., SMALL BUSINESS INTRODUCTION TO 
THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT: PART 1, at 11 (2018), https://www.nfib.com/assets/TCJA-
Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVR9-5BV4]. In terms of firm size, 36.5% of respondents 
reported gross sales in the prior fiscal year of under $500,000 and 54.4% reported gross sales 
under $1 million. Id. at 23. 
185 Id. at 14. 
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how the new tax law will affect” their businesses.186 Commentators have 
suggested that the opportunity for a deduction in 2018 may have been lost for 
those businesses that had not yet engaged with their tax professionals regarding 
§ 199A.187 Small businesses will presumably become more familiar with the 
new tax provision and may assess operational changes they could implement for 
the 2019 tax year. 
Sunset. Another important feature of the 2017 tax reform was its extensive 
use of “sunsets,” or expiration dates for various provisions.188 Section 199A is 
among the new rules that are scheduled to sunset, applying only for tax years 
beginning after December 31, 2017, and before January 1, 2026. Once enacted, 
however, deductions tend to be difficult to reverse. However, while there has 
been talk about making the deduction permanent, lawmakers have yet to do so. 
In structuring their businesses, taxpayers must therefore not only weigh whether 
the tax benefits of § 199A are worth the costs but also consider what will happen 
in 2026 if the provision expires. The possibility that the deduction will 
disappear—and thus that firms will incur additional planning and restructuring 
costs at that time—might make the switch ill-advised. 
2. Other Limiting Factors 
Section 199A aside, there are other tax and nontax factors that might affect 
the magnitude of a workplace shift. 
Need to Satisfy Classification Tests. The fact remains that to claim 
independent contractor status, one must satisfy the relevant classification tests. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that courts, tribunals, and the IRS will reclassify the 
worker. In particular, with respect to the common law control test and the tax 
law twenty-factor test, hiring firms may have to sacrifice some control over the 
worker in order to make a plausible claim for independent contractor status. In 
addition, other classification factors such as the entrepreneurial upside for the 
worker and whether the work done is an integral part of the hiring firm’s 
business impose constraints. 
As discussed above, even though each legal regime theoretically makes its 
own classification determination, in practice there seems to be little appetite 
 
186 Id. at 15. 
187 Jamie Hopkins, New Tax Deduction 199A Will Be Lost for Many in 2018, FORBES (July 
24, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2018/07/24/new-tax-
deduction-199a-will-be-lost-for-many-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/9T2M-665C]. 
188 To avoid a Democratic filibuster in the Senate, the tax legislation was passed pursuant 
to a process called budget reconciliation. Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget 
Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2018, at 61, 62. Reconciliation facilitates passage 
but limits the legislation’s ability to increase the deficit. Id. at 70; Richard Rubin, The New 
Tax Law: The Path to the Tax Overhaul, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:59 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-tax-law-the-path-to-the-tax-overhaul-1518548345 
(describing tax law’s path through Congress). 
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among businesses to arbitrage worker classification. In short, a firm’s ability to 
shift workers to independent contractor status in order to take advantage of the 
new tax law remains limited by workplace realities. An important open question 
is whether most jobs that could plausibly satisfy the relevant legal tests have 
already shifted to independent contractor classification and whether those that 
remain are actually quite difficult to shift.  
One significant caveat applies: there is evidence that worker misclassification 
is rampant and that some portion of it may be purposeful.189 Likewise, some 
businesses looking to shift worker classification after the introduction of § 199A 
may similarly feel unconstrained by law. For example, some businesses may 
continue to conduct their operations as before (along lines that clearly fail to 
meet the independent contractor test) and yet shift the tax classification of the 
employees to independent contractor. Whether outright disregard of law defeats 
the effectiveness of the classification test will depend in part on IRS enforcement 
actions and resources. 
IRS Enforcement Choices and the Limitations on Section 530 Protections. 
Enforcement choices and actions will also affect the extent of a worker 
classification shift. Penalties for misclassifying workers can be significant.190 
Depending on the degree and tenor of administrative-level enforcement and 
interpretation, enforcement choices could dampen or heighten businesses’ 
willingness to push their employees into independent contractor status. If the 
IRS does not actively enforce against misclassifications—for example, due to 
prioritizing other areas, to underfunding, or to resource constraints—this could 
lead to more aggressive assertions of independent contractor classification. 
Along these lines, it is important to note that the protections of Section 530 of 
the Revenue Act of 1978 will not be available to firms that move to reclassify as 
 
189 See sources cited supra note 178 (noting concerns about misclassification prior to 2017 
tax reform); infra note 240 and accompanying text (discussing increase in self-employed 
individuals with relatively low business expenses, which might plausibly suggest worker 
misclassification or workers that resemble employees). See generally Katherine Lim et al., 
Independent Contractor or Employee? The Changing Relationship Between Firms and Their 
Workforce and Potential Consequences for the U.S. Income Tax (Nov. 12, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193225 [https://perma.cc/L4YF-
DQQ6] (SSRN abstract) (noting increasing use of independent contractors by firms and that 
“independent contractor relationships increasingly resemble traditional employee 
relationships in their economic substance”). 
190 There is some evidence that many businesses have already been classifying their 
workers as independent contractors inaccurately, or at least in a way that may invite 
challenges. See COOK ET AL., supra note 178, at 2 (“The IRS estimates that employers 
misclassify millions of workers as independent contractors instead of employees.”); de Silva 
et al., supra note 178, at 91 (concluding that analysis of industry in five states found “high 
levels of misclassification” in several sectors). 
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independent contractors their workers currently classified as employees.191 
Section 530 bars the application of retroactive taxes, penalties, and interest on 
an employer if the employer’s classification of workers was both reasonable and 
consistently applied in prior years. The act of switching workers from employee 
to independent contractor status would not meet the “consistency” prong of the 
relief provision, which means that Section 530 would not protect firms that 
reclassify existing workers in light of § 199A. Consistent classification of new 
categories of workers as independent contractors going forward may, however, 
enjoy Section 530 protections.  
Repeal of the ACA Individual Mandate and the Availability of Health 
Insurance. In addition to introducing § 199A, the 2017 tax reform repealed the 
2010 ACA’s individual mandate.192 As discussed above, the ACA provided 
premium subsidies for lower-income individuals to help buy health insurance 
and may have made employer-provided health insurance less desirable to some 
of these individuals (who might prefer to take the premium subsidies and 
purchase their own insurance on the ACA exchanges).193 There is concern, 
however, that repeal of the individual mandate penalty may cause the ACA 
health insurance marketplaces to unravel, which may cause nonemployer-
provided health insurance plans to decline in quality, become more expensive, 
or disappear completely due to insurance market death spirals. Whether this will 
occur is an empirical question yet to be determined,194 but if it does, this might 
cause workers to be less willing to accept independent contractor classification 
due to the increased difficulty of obtaining health insurance, thereby offsetting 
the incentive created by § 199A. 
Worker Perceptions and Risk of Worker Challenges. Section 199A does not 
guarantee protection for firms against future misclassification challenges by 
workers. For example, if workers originally support a shift to independent 
contractor status but later conclude that the benefit of the deduction is 
outweighed by the downside of losing employee protections, they may challenge 
their classification. This outcome may be particularly likely if § 199A turns out 
to be more limited than expected due to strict regulatory interpretations and 
enforcement. Moreover, it is also possible that workers may not appreciate the 
benefit of § 199A, particularly relative to the other protections that are lost. If 
§ 199A is not adequately salient to taxpayers taking the deduction, this may limit 
a hiring firm’s ability to justify workplace shifts based on the deduction’s 
existence. 
 
191 Worker Reclassification—Section 530 Relief, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/worker-reclassification-section-530-relief 
[https://perma.cc/7GSG-YL6M] (last updated May 17, 2019). 
192 See supra text accompanying note 113 (discussing repeal). 
193 See supra Section II.A.3. 
194 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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State Law Shifts. Finally, there are state law shifts occurring that might cut 
against a shift toward independent contractor status. For example, in April 2018, 
the California Supreme Court decided Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. 
Superior Court.195 In that case, which applies only for purposes of California 
state wage orders, the court replaced the previously used multifactor common 
law test with a new ABC test which places the burden of establishing that a 
worker is an independent contractor on the hiring firm.196 In September 2019, 
the California legislature followed up by enacting landmark legislation (known 
as AB 5) that makes the ABC test applicable not only for purposes of state wage 
orders but also for purposes of determining workers’ compensation, 
unemployment insurance, state family leave, sick days, and other benefits.197 
The adoption of the ABC test likely makes it more difficult for businesses to 
classify workers as independent contractors, particularly in situations where the 
worker performs work that is in the ordinary course of the hiring firm’s business 
(such as driving for a platform like Uber or Lyft). Two days before the California 
legislation took effect, Uber and Postmates filed a legal challenge to the new 
worker classification law.198 
California’s legislation has reignited interest in other states to pursue 
legislative reform of worker classification standards and processes. In October 
2019, for example, New York undertook consideration of similar worker 
classification reforms.199 Should state law shifts like the one afoot in California 
take hold, companies may find it increasingly difficult to classify workers as 
independent contractors, potentially stemming a shift toward that classification. 
 
195 416 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2018); see Heather Field, Tax Implications of the Recent Dynamex 
Worker Classification Ruling, SURLY SUBGROUP (May 3, 2018), https://surlysubgroup.com 
/2018/05/03/tax-implications-of-the-recent-dynamex-worker-classification-ruling/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4GN-8BXH]. 
196 Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35 (listing ABC test’s three factors); see supra note 144 and 
accompanying text (describing ABC test in detail). 
197 Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 296 
(West), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5 
[https://perma.cc/42GX-KUGR] (codifying Dynamex holding into law to ensure that 
workers—particularly misclassified independent contractors—have basic rights and 
protections, including workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, paid sick leave, and 
paid family leave). 
198 Complaint for Violation of Federal & California Constitutional Rights, Declaratory, 
Injunctive, & Other Relief & Demand for Jury Trial at 1-2, Olson v. California, No. 2:19-cv-
10956 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 30, 2019), 2019 WL 7373427, at *1. 
199 Jimmy Vielkind, Classifying Gig Workers Poses Challenge: Albany Lawmakers Cite 
Pushback California Law Has Faced as They Prepare Legislation, WALL STREET J., Dec. 6, 
2019, at A13A; Jimmy Vielkind, Lawmakers Consider Reclassifying Gig Workers, WALL 
STREET J., Oct. 17, 2019, at A12B. 
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B. Factors That May Exacerbate a Shift 
Section 199A aside, there are other legal and economic factors that might 
contribute to or exacerbate a workplace shift. Many of these factors are gaining 
traction and exerting their influences simultaneously with § 199A. Thus, it may 
well be impossible to isolate § 199A’s effects. The better approach is to 
understand that contemporary decisions about how to work and how to classify 
workers take place in a shifting and contested landscape of legal tussles and 
broader economic transformations. 
1. Tax Factors 
New § 199A is not the only 2017 tax law change that may affect worker 
classification choices. Another variable is the new tax law’s suspension of 
miscellaneous itemized deductions, which essentially eliminates employees’ 
ability to deduct trade or business expenses through 2025.200 For employees with 
high expenses—for example, employees that might use personal vehicles or 
other capital inputs to do their jobs—the effect of this suspension is potentially 
significant. This factor, as much as § 199A itself, may be instrumental in 
widening the gap between expense recovery for independent contractors and for 
employees, consequently encouraging a shift toward independent contractor 
status. 
2. Nontax Legal Factors 
Tax law changes aside, nontax legal factors may exacerbate a shift. For 
example, hiring firms have found ways to minimize the likelihood of 
classification challenges by requiring workers to sign mandatory arbitration 
clauses.201 Such clauses have proven effective in stalling class action 
misclassification lawsuits, forcing workers (such as ridesharing drivers) to resort 
to piecemeal arbitrations and thereby reducing the likelihood of fundamental 
transformation of the business model through a single litigation.202 As further 
explored in Part IV, § 199A may be a valuable financial benefit to workers who 
have little chance of overturning their classifications as independent contractors, 
but the section may not necessarily cause the shift itself. 
 
200 See supra Section II.A.2.c (discussing such suspension). 
201 See Elizabeth C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors 
Affected Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 459, 461 
(2018) (suggesting rapid growth of arbitration clauses in wake of AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)); see also Jill I. Gross, The Uberization of Arbitration 
Clauses, 9 ARB. L. REV. 43, 43 (2017) (“These clauses often strip the weaker party of its right 
to pursue claims as class or collective actions (class action waivers).”). For example, Uber 
requires drivers to sign arbitration agreements waiving their rights to pursue class action 
challenges. See infra note 210. 
202 See Oei, supra note 58, at 130 (noting that Uber effectively stalls class action lawsuits 
by forcing its drivers to enter arbitration agreements and waive their rights to pursue class 
action challenges). 
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In addition, the changes wrought by the 2017 tax reforms are taking place at 
the same time as other legal changes. As discussed in Section II.B, the NLRB 
has recently interpreted the common law control test in a way that emphasizes 
entrepreneurial opportunities available to the worker (even if those opportunities 
are merely theoretical), and the Department of Labor withdrew informal 
guidance on application of the economic realities test. These moves make 
classifying workers as independent contractors easier for hiring firms and 
illustrate that the legal framework governing worker classification is deeply 
contested and constantly shifting, at least at the edges. This changing legal 
landscape operates alongside § 199A in shaping work and may contribute to and 
exacerbate shifts in worker classification that may arise. 
3. Economic Factors 
Finally, there are economic factors that may contribute to the acceleration of 
workplace changes. Offshoring jobs to lower-cost locations and the rising threat 
of automation displacing jobs previously done by humans stoke fears that work 
as presently conceived will soon fundamentally change and perhaps even 
disappear.203 An important current debate in both the legal and economics 
literature is the extent to which these threats to work are likely to be borne out 
and what responses society should take.204 
 
203 SRIKANT DEVERAJ ET AL., CTR. FOR BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH, BALL STATE UNIV. & 
RURAL POLICY RESEARCH INST. CTR. FOR STATE POLICY, HOW VULNERABLE ARE AMERICAN 
COMMUNITIES TO AUTOMATION, TRADE, AND URBANIZATION? 15 (2017), 
https://projects.cberdata.org/reports/Vulnerability-20170719.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD56-
X4LG] (synthesizing research that “increasingly points to the risks of large labor market 
shocks due to automation and trade”); Estlund, supra note 10, at 261-72 (discussing risks of 
automation); Katharine G. Abraham & Melissa S. Kearney, Explaining the Decline in the U.S. 
Employment-to-Population Ratio: A Review of the Evidence 13-16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 24333, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24333.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4X7E-M56U] (analyzing decline in employment and concluding that major 
factor has been rise of automation). A recent International Monetary Fund study looking at 
11,000 workers across both advanced and emerging economies concluded that worker 
reactions to automation vary, with important factors being age, job volatility, and the level of 
“robot” penetration in the domestic market. Carlos Mulas-Granados et al., Automation, Skills 
and the Future of Work: What Do Workers Think? 27-28 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 19/288, 2019), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/12/20 
/Automation-Skills-and-the-Future-of-Work-What-do-Workers-Think-48791 
[https://perma.cc/JFQ4-ZTVJ]. 
204 See supra note 203 (discussing recent empirical studies on impacts and risks of 
automating U.S. workforce). See generally NIR JAIMOVICH ET AL., THE MACROECONOMICS OF 
AUTOMATION: DATA, THEORY, AND POLICY ANALYSIS (2020), https://www.brookings.edu 
/research/a-tale-of-two-workers-the-macroeconomics-of-automation/ [https://perma.cc 
/8TAN-QE2P] (conducting empirical examination of which workers are subject to 
employment risks due to automation and what employment outcomes they experience). 
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With respect to automation, recent studies have examined how likely it is that 
current jobs will be lost to automation and what the time horizon for such 
replacement will be.205 While studies have come to varying conclusions, what is 
clear is that some researchers believe that there is a risk that automation and 
offshoring of jobs will lead to more and/or faster job destruction than job 
creation. 
The threats to workers presented by automation and offshoring may make it 
easier to shift workers to independent contractor status. If workers have less real 
or perceived bargaining power, they may be more likely to accept independent 
contractor work and independent contractor classification.  
In summary, new § 199A does not operate in a vacuum. There are legal, 
economic, and other tax changes brewing that will also affect the extent to which 
broad shifts in work and worker classification are likely to occur. In light of 
these factors, focusing only on § 199A risks framing the inquiry too narrowly. 
The more important question is how tax laws and tax law changes contribute to 
and interact with other legal and economic factors in ultimately shaping work 
arrangements.  
IV. EVALUATING A WORKPLACE SHIFT 
Having assessed why a shift might occur and the factors that might encourage 
or limit such a shift, we turn now to policy. If § 199A does cause a widespread 
shift toward independent contractor work, how should we evaluate that shift? 
Are the risks associated with such a shift real or overstated? We first outline the 
potential horribles as articulated by academics and other commentators and then 
evaluate these concerns in light of contemporary trends and empirical data. 
 
205 See generally JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., A FUTURE THAT 
WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Digital%20Disruption
/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/MGI-A-future-that-
works_Executive-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/89WP-75AE] (analyzing automation 
potential of global economy, factors determining pace and extent of workplace adoption, and 
economic impact, suggesting that half of today’s work activities could be automated by 2055); 
Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets 
36-37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, 2017), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23285.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FBL-FGZP] (estimating that 
robots will have large and robust negative effects on employment and wages across 
commuting zones); James Bessen, How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: 
Technology, Jobs, and Skills 20-26 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 15-49, 2016), http://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/NewTech-Oct-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4XN-DXUE] (rejecting computer automation as source of significant 
overall job losses but finding that computers contribute to significant job displacement 
through shift of work from noncomputerized, low-paying occupations to higher-paying, 
computerized occupations). 
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A. The Potential Horribles 
Close examination of academic and news commentary shows that when 
academics, journalists, and policymakers express concern regarding a potential 
worker classification shift, they are actually articulating two separate worries: 
First, there is a worry about widespread erosion of traditional worker protections 
and benefits and a rise in contingent and precarious work. Second, tax scholars 
in particular are concerned about “gaming”—that is, taxpayers structuring 
transactions to deliberately avoid or minimize taxes owed. We discuss each of 
these in turn. 
1. Precarious Work and the Erosion of Worker Protections 
A popular contemporary narrative is that there has been a decline in traditional 
employment with its stability and protections and a rise in freelance, temporary, 
contract, and similar work. Sociologists, economists, and other commentators 
refer to this type of work as “precarious work” and have coined terms like the 
“precariat” (a frankenword alluding to the precarious proletariat) and 
“contingent workforce” and “alternative work arrangements” (terms denoting 
the class of workers who lack job security, stability, employee protections, and 
benefits).206  
A 2017 survey commissioned by Freelancers Union and Upwork found 
dramatic growth in freelancers and projected that freelancers would comprise 
the majority of the U.S. workforce within the next decade.207 The study 
specifically found that 57.3 million people freelanced in 2017, that the freelance 
workforce had grown at three times the rate of the overall U.S. workforce since 
2014, and that almost half of millennials freelanced.208 The report claimed: 
 
206 See SUSAN J. LAMBERT, PETER J. FUGIEL & JULIA R. HENLY, UNIV. OF CHI., PRECARIOUS 
WORK SCHEDULES AMONG EARLY-CAREER EMPLOYEES IN THE US: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT 18 
(2014), https://www.ssa.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/uploads/lambert.fugiel.henly_.pre 
carious_work_schedules.august2014_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3VU-9JX7] (finding that 
many workers are “at considerable risk of unpredictable, unstable work hours over which they 
may have little control”); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS 7-11 
(2011) (discussing origins, definitions, and interpretations of term “precariat”); Arne L. 
Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations in Transition, 74 AM. 
SOC. REV. 1, 2-17 (2009) (referencing “nonstandard” work, “contingent” work, and 
“alternative employment opportunities” in analyzing job insecurity, economic insecurity, and 
inequality in the contemporary employment sphere); Daniel Schneider & Kristen Harknett, 
Consequences of Routine Work-Schedule Instability for Worker Health and Well-Being, 84 
AM. SOC. REV. 82, 107-09 (2019) (examining how unpredictable schedules are negatively 
associated with household financial security, health, and parenting practices). 
207 FREELANCERS UNION & UPWORK, FREELANCING IN AMERICA: 2017, at 2 (2017) 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/fuwt-prod-storage/content/FreelancingInAmericaReport-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WMT-5JVT]. 
208 Id. at 3. 
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The traditional pillars of work in America—commuting, a 9-to-5 
workday, a single long-term employer—have been eroding for decades. An 
increasing number of Americans are forgoing work with a single 
employer—and the access to benefits like health insurance and retirement 
plans that go with it—in favor of the autonomy and flexibility that comes 
with freelancing.209 
Independent contractor work is not necessarily synonymous with precarious 
or contingent work. For example, architects, lawyers, and other professionals 
might be well-remunerated and nonprecarious independent contractors, while 
food service workers may well be precarious employees. However, the rise in 
precariousness in the labor market is often broadly associated with a shift toward 
independent contractor or self-employed status since those statuses often do not 
provide the benefits and protections traditionally associated with full-time 
employment. 
Several high-profile litigations involving technology firms such as Uber, Lyft, 
and Grubhub have reinforced the association between independent contractor 
status and contingent work. In litigation, these firms have characterized their 
workers as independent contractors and have invoked arbitration clauses, 
challenges to class action certifications, and substantive arguments to fight 
worker challenges to independent contractor classification.210 To date the firms 
have been quite successful in staving off reclassification of workers as 
employees. In February 2018, a California court ruled that the plaintiff, a 
Grubhub delivery driver, was an independent contractor under California law.211 
And in April 2018, a federal court in Pennsylvania ruled in favor of Uber’s 
motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff driver was an 
independent contractor—not an employee—under the FLSA.212 
 
209 Id. at 5. 
210 See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(classifying driver as independent contractor under California labor law); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 
176 F. Supp. 3d 930, 931-37 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
approval of Lyft’s proposed class action settlement yet rejecting arguments that settlement 
should have contained terms reclassifying Lyft drivers as employees); O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (describing Uber’s self-identification 
as platform for independent contractor drivers to connect with passengers desiring rides); see 
also Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing order 
denying motion to compel arbitration and describing Uber’s use of class action waivers and 
arbitration agreements in driver contracts); Lamour v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-21449, 
2017 WL 878712, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2017) (granting Uber’s motion to strike collective 
action allegations and staying case pending arbitrator’s resolution of Lamour’s individual 
claim). 
211 Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. 
212 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00573, 2016 WL 5874822, at *19 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 7, 2016). 
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It is true that workers have recently prevailed in state-level unemployment-
insurance litigations. For example, in July 2018, New York’s Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board concluded in a final determination that three Uber 
drivers were employees entitled to New York state unemployment insurance 
benefits.213 Additionally, in April 2018, the California Supreme Court adopted 
a new classification test—the ABC test—that likely makes it more difficult for 
businesses to classify workers as independent contractors (a decision that was 
the basis for California’s 2019 legislation).214 However, the litigation landscape 
has by and large favored hiring firms.215 These types of litigations have helped 
associate contingent, on-demand work with an independent contractor shift. 
2. Games, Tax Planning, and Tax Base Erosion 
At the other end of the spectrum, when tax scholars and policymakers have 
worried about an independent contractor shift, they have also worried about 
high-end gaming and tax planning and the resulting tax base erosion. The 
expectation is that it is too easy for sophisticated taxpayers with access to good 
tax advice to restructure their operations or make alternative work choices so 
that they can take advantage of the new pass-through deduction. So, for example, 
law firms may find ways to convert lawyers who are currently employees into 
independent contractors or partners, assuming they are below the § 199A 
income thresholds and otherwise qualify for the deduction.216 
In contrast to concerns over worker precariousness, the gaming worry centers 
on distortionary and inefficient tax planning, unfair tax avoidance, and erosion 
of the tax base, all of which may lead to a decline in revenues and a ballooning 
federal deficit.217 The worry is not that the workers in question are vulnerable; 
rather, it is that they may be too good at reducing their taxes. 
B. Breaking Down the Risks 
How concerned should we be with these policy horribles and the risks they 
present? To answer this question, we evaluate the currently available data on 
workforce composition, collected prior to § 199A taking effect. This allows us 
 
213 Uber Techs., Inc., Appeal Bd. No. 596722, at 10 (State of N.Y. Unemployment Ins. 
Appeal Bd. July 12, 2018), http://uiappeals.ny.gov/uiappeal-decisions/596722-appeal-
decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HTB-69X2]. 
214 See supra note 195 and accompanying sources. For a discussion of the 2019 California 
worker classification legislation, see supra Section III.A.2. 
215 Oei, supra note 58, at 128-29; Ring, supra note 148, at 83. 
216 See Kamin et al., supra note 4, at 1462-64 (describing “gaming” as process of 
reclassifying lawyers or doctors from employees to independent contractors to qualify for 
§ 199A deduction). 
217 See id. at 1442 (suggesting that “many of the new changes fundamentally undermine 
the integrity of the tax code” and enable “well-advised” taxpayers to engage in “strategic 
planning”). 
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to get a sense of the types of shifts that are already underway, how concerning 
they are, and what other shifts might unfold in the future. We then discuss, by 
analyzing differently situated hypothetical workers, how the risks associated 
with a § 199A-induced shift toward independent contractor work may differ 
depending on the type of work and workers. 
1. Size and Composition of the Independent Contractor Workforce 
It is difficult to get a complete picture of contemporary workplace shifts, 
including worker classification shifts, based on existing empirical work. 
Incomplete data, definitional and measurement issues, and vested interests of 
some of those conducting the analyses mean that evidence of a workplace shift 
is messy and inconclusive.218 While some claim that there has been a significant 
shift toward independent work, recent government data suggest that the shift 
may be overstated or at least may be a more complex phenomenon than simply 
employee jobs turning into independent contractor jobs. It is also difficult to get 
a complete picture of which populations and demographics are affected by 
workplace shifts. Even researchers who previously reported a shift toward 
independent contractor work have revised their earlier claims.219 
An important point to note is that “contingent work,” “independent 
contracting,” “alternative work arrangements,” “independent workforce,” and 
“freelancers” are all terms frequently used to describe the claimed phenomenon 
of a workplace shift. However, they do not all mean the same thing and are not 
all defined the same way in existing survey-based studies.220 Moreover, these 
terms do not map perfectly onto research findings based on tax return data. 
Starting with the big picture, IRS tax return data show that in 2014, 190 
million individuals filed a tax return with 146 million reporting positive earnings 
 
218 See, e.g., FREELANCERS UNION & UPWORK, supra note 207, at 1, 5 (reporting on 
“freelancers” (individuals who “perform[ed] supplemental, temporary, project- or contract-
based work” in past twelve months) in study commissioned by independent contractor 
advocacy organization and gig-work employment platform); PAUL OYER, UPWORK, THE 
INDEPENDENT WORKFORCE IN AMERICA: THE ECONOMICS OF AN INCREASINGLY FLEXIBLE 
LABOR MARKET 1 (2016), https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/adquiro-content-prod 
/documents/paul_oyer_the_independent_workforce_in_america.pdf [https://perma.cc/83N5-
DXZP] (study commissioned by gig-work employment platform). 
219 See Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, Understanding Trends in Alternative Work 
Arrangements in the United States, RSF, Dec. 2019, at 132, 133 [hereinafter Katz & Krueger, 
Understanding Trends] (reconciling results of authors’ 2015 study and BLS’s 2017 data, both 
cited infra note 224).  
220 See CHARLES A. JESZECK ET AL., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-168R, 
CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNINGS, AND BENEFITS 3 (2015), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669766.pdf [https://perma.cc/85LH-RATN] (finding that 
proportional size of contingent workforce varies greatly depending on definitions and data 
source). 
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(including both wages and self-employment income).221 Of those with positive 
earnings, 86.7% had solely W-2 income from an employer-employee 
relationship, 7.2% had income solely from self-employment, and 6.1% had both 
wage and employment income.222 In the same year, 24.9 million individuals filed 
returns reporting nonfarm sole proprietorship (Schedule C) activity and almost 
17 million individuals reported profit from self-employment earnings.223 These 
figures provide a sense of the raw numbers of self-employed taxpayers and the 
percentage of the workforce they represent. 
But how has the share of self-employed taxpayers in the workforce changed 
over time? Here, findings from various studies must be pieced together to 
provide a clear picture. In June 2018, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(“BLS”) released preliminary 2017 survey data on contingent and alternative 
employment relationships.224 The last time BLS conducted such a survey was in 
2005, before the financial crisis and the rise of the gig economy.225 While there 
has been much recent publicity about how the rise of the contingent workforce 
and nontraditional work arrangements is marking the end of traditional 
 
221 Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative Work 
Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 10 (Office of 
Tax Analysis, Working Paper No. 114, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-114.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB3X-76LG]. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 3. 
224 Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements—May 2017 (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release 
/pdf/conemp.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7KA-KDDF] [hereinafter BLS 2017 Summary]. Prior to 
the release of this data, a National Bureau of Economic Research study sought to fill the 2005-
2015 gap in BLS data collection on alternative work arrangements. See generally Lawrence 
F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the 
United States, 1995-2015 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22667, 2016), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22667.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2BN-6ZFZ]. But that study was 
subsequently revised in light of updated BLS data. Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, The 
Rise and Nature of Alternative Work Arrangements in the United States, 1995-2015, 72 ILR 
REV. 382, 382-84 (2019) [hereinafter Katz & Krueger, Rise and Nature] (describing results 
of contingent worker survey with data from 2005 to 2015 and providing a short addendum 
reconciling BLS data); Katz & Krueger, Understanding Trends, supra note 219, at 133 
(explaining timeline of 2015 study and release of BLS’s 2017 study and reconciling 
discrepancy between them more fully). 
225 ELKA TORPEY & ANDREW HOGAN, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKING IN A 
GIG ECONOMY 3 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/pdf/what-is-the-gig-
economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG3M-FQGW]. For the 2005 survey results, see generally 
Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative Employment 
Arrangements, February 2005 (July 27, 2005), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives 
/conemp_07272005.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GET-J9YS]. 
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employment,226 the 2017 BLS data suggested that there had not been a dramatic 
shift toward alternative work arrangements.227 The BLS survey looked at two 
basic categories of nontraditional workers: those in “contingent work 
arrangements” (i.e., those reporting temporary jobs)228 and those in “alternative 
employment arrangements” (consisting of independent contractors, on-call 
workers, temporary help agency workers, and contract workers).229 The BLS 
preliminary data showed little or no shift in either contingent work or alternative 
employment arrangements. For example, under three different estimates, 
contingent workers accounted for between 1.3% and 3.8% of total employed 
workers in 2017, compared to between 1.8% and 4.1% in 2005.230 Similarly, 
6.9% of workers under alternative work arrangements identified themselves as 
“independent contractors, independent consultants, or freelance workers, 
regardless of whether they are self-employed or wage and salary workers,” 
compared to 7.4% in February 2005.231 
 
226 See, e.g., INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT: TWENTY TRENDS THAT WILL SHAPE THE NEXT 
DECADE 20-21 (2010), https://http-download.intuit.com/http.intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmall 
business/intuit_2020_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X4T-UGNZ] (predicting that percentage 
of contingent workers—freelancers, temps, part-time workers, and contractors—will rise 
from 25-30% of workforce to over 40% by 2020); Thogori Karago, How the Freelance 
Generation Is Redefining Professional Norms, LINKEDIN: OFFICIAL BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://blog.linkedin.com/2017/february/21/how-the-freelance-generation-is-redefining-
professional-norms-linkedin [https://perma.cc/RU5U-ELWE] (predicting that freelancers 
will comprise 43% of workforce in 2020, up from 6% in 1989); John White, How the Rapid 
Rise of the Gig Economy Is Changing the Way We Work, INC. (June 1, 2017), 
https://www.inc.com/john-white/the-rapid-rise-of-the-gig-economy-is-changing-the-way-
we-work.html [https://perma.cc/6H9Y-G8FH] (contending that with gig economy, 
percentage of freelancers in United States will rise to 43% by 2020). 
227 KAREN KOSANOVICH, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKERS IN ALTERNATIVE 
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 2 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/workers-in-
alternative-employment-arrangements/pdf/workers-in-alternative-employment-
arrangements.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4SK-8K4Y]; BLS 2017 Summary, supra note 224, at 1. 
Other sources critique the claims that the number of gig workers is rising. See Ben Casselman, 
The Exaggerated Gig Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2018, at B1 (identifying weaknesses in 
claimed growth in sector); Laura Gardiner, Does the Gig Economy Revolutionise the World 
of Work, or Is It a Storm in a Teacup?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2015/10/23/does-the-gig-economy-
revolutionise-the-world-of-work-or-is-it-a-storm-in-a-teacup (analyzing limitations of 
current data). 
228 Contingent workers provide their services without an implicit or explicit long-term 
contract. BLS 2017 Summary, supra note 224, at 2. 
229 Id. The updated 2017 BLS survey added four new questions regarding the role of work 
found through mobile apps and websites. Id. at 1. 
230 Id. at 2. Two of the three estimates include subsets of self-employed and of independent 
contractor workers. Id. 
231 Id. 
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Part of the reason the 2017 BLS data may have failed to reflect an increase in 
independent contractors was that the survey asked each respondent to report on 
her main job, a question that does not capture those respondents supplementing 
traditional work with nontraditional work as a side job.232 As Annette Bernhardt 
has suggested, the BLS measurement consists mostly of “traditional independent 
contractors” (e.g., architects, real estate agents, and hair stylists) who do the 
independent contractor work as their main job.233 A 2019 IRS study supported 
this explanation, noting that among workers receiving Forms 1099 between 
2000 and 2016, (1) the share of the workforce receiving income from 
nonemployee sources rose by 1.9%; (2) half of that increase developed from 
2013 to 2016, primarily due to a rise in online platform workers; and (3) workers 
using online platforms for secondary or supplemental income drove the increase 
in platform work.234 Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (“Fed 
Bank”) have observed that the BLS statistics may not have captured those who 
engaged in informal work (including independent contractor work) to 
compensate for their inability to obtain full-time employment.235 This gap may 
be especially important given that Fed Bank’s own data indicated that the highest 
rates of participation in informal work were among workers designated “part-
time for economic reasons”—those seeking full-time work but unable to find 
it—rather than those classified as unemployed or not in the workforce.236 
The BLS data may have also failed to detect an increase in independent 
contractors due to inconsistent worker survey responses. A 2018 study compared 
 
232 For a useful review of the BLS release of preliminary data in June 2018, see Annette 
Bernhardt, Making Sense of the New Government Data on Contingent Work, U.C. BERKELEY 
LAB. CTR. (June 10, 2018), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/making-sense-new-government-
data-contingent-work/ [https://perma.cc/9PSY-EH2H]. 
233 Id. (“A lot of these workers are what I think of as traditional independent contractors—
everything from real estate agents, architects, and entertainers to hair stylists, family child 
care providers, and plumbers.”). 
234 Brett Collins et al., Is Gig Work Replacing Traditional Employment? Evidence from 
Two Decades of Tax Returns 1, 8-9 (Mar. 25, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpgigworkreplacingtraditionalemployment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JZ4C-UEPU] (focusing on measuring taxpayers receiving Forms 1099, as 
opposed to Schedule SE filers, based on evidence that many workers receiving Form 1099 
did not file Schedule SE even if it may have been required). 
235 See Anat Bracha & Mary A. Burke, Who Counts as Employed? Informal Work, 
Employment Status, and Labor Market Slack 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper 
No. 16-29, 2016), https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/Workingpapers/PDF 
/wp1629.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDX5-FHPZ] (explaining that many BLS measures would 
have been higher if they included informal workers). 
236 Id. 
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census survey responses and tax data for the same individuals.237 Over the period 
from 1996 to 2012, the study found that although there was inconsistency in both 
directions, (1) self-employment reported through tax data grew “markedly” 
between 1996 and 2012238 and (2) there was a growing gap between self-
employment numbers derived from tax data and self-employment numbers 
derived from survey data during this period.239 In short, some workers reported 
in surveys that they were employees despite filing a tax return reflecting self-
employment.  
A recent Treasury Office of Tax Analysis working paper that drew on tax 
return data helped to capture more detail on a possible rise in self-
employment.240 The Treasury paper reported an increase in the number of 
individuals filing either Schedule SE (tax due on net self-employment earnings) 
or Schedule C (profit or loss from business) between 2000 and 2014, which 
suggests an increase in the number of independent contractors.241 The share of 
the workforce reporting self-employment income on Schedule C rose from 
about 8.5% to 11% over that period.242 The 2019 IRS study of 1099 workers 
offered further insight into this growth, finding that the rise in Schedule SE filing 
from 2007 to 2016 was due to workers without Forms 1099 who were EITC 
claimants.243 
The Treasury paper attributed the shift largely to an increase in self-employed 
individuals with relatively low business expenses, which suggests that the 
 
237 Katharine G. Abraham et al., Measuring the Gig Economy: Current Knowledge and 
Open Issues 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24950, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24950.pdf [https://perma.cc/83G4-M4B7]. 
238 Id. at 19, 46 fig.2A (describing discrepancies between both data sources). 
239 Id. at 19, 46 fig.2B. Of these tax-reported self-employed workers, some reported no 
employment income in the survey, some reported only wage income in the survey and both 
wage and employment income for tax, and some reported only wage income in the survey 
and only self-employment income for tax. Id. 
240 See Jackson, Looney & Ramnath, supra note 221, at 9. The Treasury report details the 
shortcomings of survey data in capturing self-employment income and reviews the reasons 
for these deficits. Id. at 6-8. 
241 Id. at 16, 26 fig.3. The number of individuals filing Schedule C increased by 37% and 
those with self-employment income increased by 29%. Id. 
242 Id. In 2014, there were 19.3 million Schedule SE filers, of which 3.4 million were 
primarily wage earners, 3.5 million were filers with both wage and sole proprietorship 
income, and 10.3 million were primarily self-employed sole proprietors. Id. at 31 tbl.4. 
Treasury described filers with at least 85% of their earnings from wages as “primarily wage 
earners”; described filers with between 15% to 85% of their income from wages (but who 
also filed Schedule C with a profit) as filers with “earnings from both wages and sole 
proprietorship”; and described filers with less than 15% of income from wages (and who filed 
Schedule C with a profit) as “primarily self-employed sole proprietors.” Id. at 14. 
243 See Collins et al., supra note 234, at 19. 
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income is earned largely from labor rather than capital inputs.244 For example, 
the study found a 70% increase in the number of Schedule SE filers with 
earnings from both wages and sole proprietorships with less than $5000 of 
expenses, but only a 5% increase in filers with more than $5000 of expenses.245 
The share of the workforce with primarily sole proprietor earnings but less than 
five thousand dollars in expenses increased by 88%.246 There was also a 36% 
increase in filers who were primarily wage earners but also had sole 
proprietorship earnings.247 Thus, the Treasury data revealed an increase in self-
employed individuals largely providing labor with low business expenses and 
showed that this increase happened with respect not only to those whose primary 
income source was wages but also to those whose primary source of income was 
self-employment.248 
With respect to the gig economy, the Treasury study found that for 2014, only 
109,700 individuals reported income from gig work.249 Of these, 39% were 
primarily wage earners who supplemented wages with gig work, 19.5% had 
income from both wages and self-employment, and 33% did gig work as their 
primary job.250 Consistent with other studies, Treasury found that only a small 
percentage of the total workforce (0.7%) had worked for an online platform in 
2014, despite the fact that much of the public debate over work centers on the 
gig economy.251  
 
244 See Jackson, Looney & Ramnath, supra note 221, at 13, 17. 
245 Id. at 17, 31 tbl.4. 
246 Id. 
247 See id. at 31 tbl.4. 
248 Id. at 17. Others have suggested more strongly that the increase in self-employment is 
primarily due to individuals doing supplemental work. See, e.g., Lawrence Mishel, Social 
Security Data Confirm Same Old Pattern: Self-Employment Headcount Has Risen but 
Economic Impact Remains Small, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (June 28, 2018, 
10:35 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/social-security-data-confirm-same-old-pattern-self-
employment-headcount-has-risen-but-economic-impact-remains-small/ [https://perma.cc 
/TVD6-ZM6N] (extrapolating from Social Security data that 40% of self-employed taxpayers 
also had W-2 income and noting that “inflation adjusted self-employment earnings per filer 
actually declined 5.8 percent from 2000 to 2015 while W-2 wage earners saw their annual 
earnings grow by 8.5 percent”). 
249 Jackson, Looney & Ramnath, supra note 221, at 16 (“In 2014, only a small group—
about 109,700 individuals—file[d] a return reporting income from participating in a ‘gig 
economy’ or online platform based business . . . .”). “Gig economy” refers to work performed 
as an independent contractor through platforms such as Airbnb and TaskRabbit. See Oei, 
supra note 58, at 109-11 (discussing evolving usage and impact of terms “sharing economy,” 
“gig economy,” “1099 economy,” and others). 
250 Jackson, Looney & Ramnath, supra note 221, at 16 (quantifying primary income 
sources for gig economy participants). 
251 Id. at 7-8, 16. Studies suggest that the gig economy comprises 0.4% to 0.6% of workers, 
and one study found that within its survey pool, the percentage of adults who had worked in 
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Another recent paper based on tax return data supported and extended some 
of the findings of the Treasury study.252 That paper found a 22% increase in 
workers with independent contractor income between 2001 and 2016, which 
corroborated the findings of the Treasury study.253 The paper found a steady 
increase in workers earning independent contractor income as their primary 
income source, as well as an increase in workers earning independent contractor 
income as supplemental income.254 Primary earners earning primarily 
independent contractor income exhibited the fastest growth, though the number 
of workers earning independent contractor income as a secondary income source 
had grown rapidly since 2013.255 However, the paper also found that the largest 
share of independent contractors received most of their income from wage 
employment and were in the top income quartile.256 These findings were also in 
line with the Treasury study’s findings that increases in independent contractor 
work were occurring with respect to differently situated workers.  
In addition, the paper found that the growth in independent contractors was 
disproportionately driven by increases in female independent contractors; that 
“the majority” of female independent contractors had independent contractor 
income that supplemented W-2 earnings; and that the largest growth in female 
independent contractors occurred for those for whom independent contractor 
earnings were the primary source of labor income, with these latter households 
being disproportionately in the bottom income-distribution quartile.257 The 
paper seems to suggest that some of this independent contractor growth stemmed 
from individuals transitioning from having no employment income to having 
independent contractor income.258 
Together, BLS and Fed Bank survey data and the studies based on tax return 
data allow us to make some preliminary observations. First, the Treasury and 
Fed Bank studies suggest that notwithstanding the BLS data there has already 
been some increase in self-employment and independent contracting, 
 
the gig economy within the previous thirty days rose from 0.1% in October 2012 to 1% in 
September 2015. Id. at 7; see DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JPMORGAN CHASE INST., 
PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY 5 (2016), 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility-2-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YTR-GSN5]. 
252 Katherine Lim et al., Independent Contractors in the U.S.: New Trends from 15 Years 
of Administrative Tax Data 2 (July 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y3W-8H4H]. 
253 Id. at 2, 8. Lim et al. operationalize their study differently than the Treasury study (by 
excluding those with large deductions) in order to isolate individuals receiving compensation 
for their labor rather than capital investments. Id. at 10-11. 
254 Id. at 17. 
255 Id. at 18-19. 
256 Id. at 19. 
257 Id. 
258 See id. at 22. 
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represented mostly by labor providers with low expenses rather than traditional 
small business work. The fact that Treasury and Katherine Lim and her 
coauthors uncovered an increase while BLS did not may be due to the fact that 
some of the increase was attributable to individuals earning a mix of wage and 
self-employment income. BLS, by focusing on main jobs, would not have picked 
this up.259 Interestingly, authors of a 2015 study finding a notable rise in 
alternative work arrangements recently restated their own findings.260 The 
original paper contended, based on an online survey, that alternative work 
arrangements in the United States (defined as including temporary, on-call, and 
contract workers as well as independent contractors and freelancers) rose from 
10.7% in 2005 to 15.8% in 2015, with the largest rise (increasing from 1.4% to 
3.1%) due to those working for contract companies.261 However, the authors 
reassessed the work in light of the 2017 BLS data and IRS data through 2016, 
and they have now concluded that the growth in alternative work arrangements 
was more modest once adjusted for differences in survey methods, data 
reliability, and cyclical labor markets.262 
Any numerical increase aside, the characteristics of the new self-employed 
filers are also important. Studies based on tax return data suggest that some 
nontrivial portion of self-employed taxpayers—and a nontrivial portion of the 
increase in such taxpayers—is attributable to workers with W-2 jobs who are 
more likely to have some protections and benefits from the W-2 jobs and who 
do self-employment work on the side.263 For such taxpayers, a shift toward 
independent contractor work may be less—or differently—concerning than if 
the shift was due to workers leaving (or losing) W-2 jobs altogether to do 
independent contractor jobs. As Bernhardt argued, much of the increase in 
independent contractor work that has been observed thus far might reflect a 
“privatization of the safety net”—in which workers supplement income or 
manage financial shocks by working a second job—rather than a shift away from 
W-2 work per se.264 The question, then, is how we feel about such privatization 
as a policy matter. For example, we might ask whether factors such as stagnant 
 
259 See, e.g., Abraham et al., supra note 237, at 5 (seeking to reconcile current data); 
Bernhardt, supra note 232 (describing BLS survey’s objectives and data observed). 
260 See generally Katz & Krueger, Understanding Trends, supra note 219. 
261 Katz & Krueger, Rise and Nature, supra note 224, at 383. 
262 Katz & Krueger, Understanding Trends, supra note 219, at 144. 
263 See also Mishel, supra note 248 (drawing similar conclusions from Social Security 
data). 
264 Bernhardt, supra note 232 (“If so, that would mean that independent contracting isn’t 
so much replacing W-2 jobs as making up for low wages, insufficient hours, or loss of 
earnings during spells of unemployment. At least for low-income workers, we may well be 
seeing the privatization of the safety net.”); Amanda Dixon, The Average Side Hustler Earns 
over $8K Annually, BANKRATE (June 25, 2018), https://www.bankrate.com/personal-
finance/smart-money/side-hustles-survey-june-2018/ [https://perma.cc/B8PN-MBKJ] 
(reporting Bankrate survey that 37% of Americans have side jobs and 38% of them rely on 
additional income to fund ordinary living expenses). 
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wages have led to such privatization and whether tax law overly subsidizes this 
privatized safety net, entrenching it at the expense of other methods of delivering 
economic security, such as direct governmental support. We might also 
plausibly ask whether the new tax law will lead to a shift from wage work to 
independent contractor work that is fundamentally different than the part-time 
shifts that may have happened to date.  
2. Heterogeneous Policy Concerns in a Heterogeneous Workforce 
In light of the complexities revealed by the existing data, we now look at how 
the policy risks of an independent contractor shift induced by § 199A may vary 
depending on the type of work and workers. As the above discussion shows, 
workers and work arrangements are heterogeneous: workers may do primarily 
W-2 work and earn supplemental self-employed income, a mix of both types of 
work, or be primarily self-employed, and each worker’s mix may change over 
time. The incentives and preferences of each type of worker vary and 
correspondingly their responses to § 199A will likely vary as well. The real 
impact of § 199A will turn on the specifics of each worker’s situation.  
To highlight the real-world variation, we now discuss some examples of 
differently situated workers, the potential impacts of § 199A on them, and the 
potential policy risks posed in each case. Our discussion shows that the policy 
concerns raised by any workplace shifts will vary depending on how a worker is 
situated and that it is difficult to make generalizations about the dangers and 
desirability of such shifts.  
a. Worker Currently Combining W-2 Work and Part-Time Independent 
Contractor Work 
The BLS, Treasury, and IRS data suggest that there is a nontrivial-sized group 
of workers who may work a main W-2 job and do independent contractor work 
on the side for supplemental income or who do a combination of W-2 and 
independent contractor work.265 Section 199A may cause such workers to work 
less. Thus, for example, a W-2 worker who drives for Uber on the weekends 
might drive less because the § 199A deduction enables her to achieve the same 
after-tax pay from fewer hours of driving. Alternatively, § 199A may lead the 
worker to either drive more hours and sacrifice leisure (because driving has 
become more financially attractive after taxes) or drive more and quit the W-2 
job (because driving for Uber is now more financially rewarding than the W-2 
work).  
In some cases, workers who keep their W-2 positions and drive either more 
hours or fewer hours in response to § 199A may raise fewer concerns about 
 
265 Bernhardt, supra note 232 (estimating, based on Treasury study, that 6% to 8% of 
workers supplement W-2 work with independent contractor work); see Collins et al., supra 
note 234, at 4 (finding that contractor work “typically supplements traditional W2 traditional 
jobs over the course of the year” for many workers); supra Section IV.B.1 (discussing size 
and composition of contractor workforce). 
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worker precariousness. Some of these workers may already derive healthcare, 
retirement, and other benefits from their W-2 work and may be less concerned 
about the limited protections of the independent contractor job. They might 
prioritize the flexibility of the side job over employee protections, especially if 
they believe that reclassification might reduce pay or make the side job disappear 
through automation or offshoring should firm costs (with employees) rise too 
high.266 For these workers, the § 199A deduction might act primarily as a 
subsidy that buttresses income security. This viewpoint is reflected in 
heterogeneous attitudes that have been expressed by Uber and Lyft drivers; 
despite high-profile litigations, it is clear that not all drivers want to be 
employees. Rather, some prefer the flexibility and independence of independent 
contractor status.267 Indeed, after California’s recent Dynamex decision, one 
driver articulated the hope that the ruling would force Uber to allow drivers to 
be more independent and to set their own rates.268 
Workers who quit their W-2 jobs or reduce W-2 work to take on more 
independent contractor work due to § 199A raise different and potentially more 
serious concerns. If such a shift occurs, that might cause us more worry about 
loss of benefits and protections from traditional employment. The degree of 
worry would depend on what type of independent contractor work is replacing 
the W-2 work. If workers switch from secure W-2 jobs to become well-
remunerated, self-employed professionals, such as architects or engineers, and 
if we assume that these types of workers are sophisticated enough to self-insure 
against risks and shocks, this might raise concerns about gaming and tax-base 
erosion but perhaps not so much about worker precariousness. But if workers 
quit solid W-2 jobs to take on precarious independent contractor work in light 
of the new deduction, this would be more worrisome.  
Likewise, if employers use the new § 199A deduction as an excuse to 
eliminate W-2 jobs and convert the workforce into reduced-security independent 
contractor jobs, this would raise concerns about workplace shifts and worker 
precariousness. As noted, however, the incentives for employers to initiate the 
shift are complex because the § 199A benefit nominally inures to the worker, 
and hiring firms must be able to make a plausible case under the various tests 
 
266 See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from 
Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56, 88 (2017). 
267 See id.; Tom Welsh, The Uber Ruling Is Bad for Drivers and Customers—Self-
Employment Is the Way Forward, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2016, 10:27 PM), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/29/the-uber-ruling-is-bad-for-drivers-and-
customers---self-employme/ [https://perma.cc/599V-GZFR] (offering U.K.-based view that 
employee classification could be undesirable for drivers due to likely effects on prices 
customers are charged and level of control exerted by Uber). 
268 Andrew Khouri & Tracey Lien, Work Rules Set to Change; Gig Jobs May Face a 
Shakeup After a Court Ruling on Classification of Contractors, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2018, at 
C1 (discussing possible responses to California decision). 
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that the workers are independent contractors, a factor that might prevent some 
shifts.269 
b. Existing Full-Time Independent Contractor 
Workers who are currently full-time independent contractors present different 
issues. The § 199A deduction may solidify such workers’ independent 
contractor statuses. This outcome would pose no problem for those workers who 
genuinely belong in the category, such as professionals with their own client 
bases, as long as they otherwise meet the statutory line-of-business and income-
threshold requirements.270  
But for independent contractors who are improperly classified, there are two 
interconnected ways in which the deduction might cement the inappropriate 
classification: First, the deduction, which effectively increases the after-tax 
income of the worker at no cost to the business, may lower worker resistance to 
misclassification and dampen protests, reducing the likelihood of worker 
lawsuits and leaving the task of identifying misclassifications to government-
initiated actions. Second, if workers increase labor supply due to the deduction, 
this would benefit employers, lowering costs and giving hiring firms leeway to 
weed out disgruntled workers.  
For some workers, the question of whether they have been misclassified may 
be a close call. Assuming that in such borderline cases workers are less likely to 
prevail in a lawsuit, the new § 199A deduction could be viewed as a partial 
subsidy offsetting their loss of benefits due to a misclassification that is unlikely 
to be rectified in court. 
c. Worker Currently Combining Full-Time and Part-Time W-2 Work 
Not all workers seeking to supplement full-time W-2 work do so through 
independent contractor work. Some may do part-time W-2 work (e.g., evening 
or weekend shifts in food service or retail). For such workers, the § 199A 
deduction creates a potential inequity between their part-time W-2 work and the 
independent contractor work done by others. This might entice such workers to 
replace full- or part-time W-2 work with part-time independent contractor work. 
Some workers might keep their main W-2 jobs for their protections and 
benefits while replacing their part-time W-2 jobs with independent contractor 
jobs to qualify for the § 199A deduction. Others may cut back on both their main 
W-2 work and their part-time W-2 work to take advantage of § 199A, either by 
switching jobs or by seeking to reclassify existing jobs. Again, the extent to 
which we find these moves concerning would depend on (1) the type of 
independent contractor work at issue and how precarious it is and (2) the extent 
to which the switch happens because hiring firms are successfully using § 199A 
 
269 See Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3) (2019) (creating rebuttable presumption that former 
employees are still employees). 
270 See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2)-(3), (e)(2) (2018); id. § 1202(e)(3)(A) (describing those 
requirements). 
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as an impetus to eliminate W-2 jobs. Hiring firms’ abilities and propensities to 
eliminate W-2 jobs will also depend on each firm’s ability to meet the relevant 
legal tests and rebut the applicable regulatory presumptions; the elasticity in 
labor markets; and the availability of alternative cost-saving workforce 
solutions, such as subcontracting. 
d. Full-Time W-2 Employee Converting to Independent Contractor 
A final shift worth observing is the possibility that some current full-time W-2 
workers will shift to full-time independent contractors. This could happen in two 
ways: First, these workers may remain at the same W-2 jobs but attempt to 
relabel themselves as independent contractors. Second, workers may quit or cut 
back on their W-2 jobs and take up independent contractor jobs instead.  
For sophisticated employees, the first outcome may well fall into the gaming 
category.271 For example, sophisticated employees may try to sever employment 
and come back as independent contractors doing substantially the same work, or 
those employees may combine with others to form partnerships that provide 
services to the businesses that previously employed them.272 This may invite 
scrutiny regarding whether the new arrangement is sufficiently different from 
the old and whether the requirements for independent contractor classification 
are satisfied.273 As a policy matter, how problematic we find this planning 
behavior will partially depend on how aggressive and unethical such gaming is 
compared to the tax planning and gaming that already happens under current 
law. For other workers, relabeling may occur at the initiative of the employer 
and may succeed due to the workers’ failure to appreciate the loss of protections 
or the workers’ lack of negotiating power. For such workers, the concern would 
be less about gaming and more about a rise in precariousness. 
With respect to the second strategy, our assessment of the risks will depend 
on the type of independent contractor job the employee has shifted to (i.e., 
precarious or not), the sophistication of the worker (i.e., whether she is able to 
self-insure), and the degree of compulsion the hiring firm exercises upon the 
worker.274 As noted, we might be less worried about higher-income workers 
becoming self-employed than we are about shifts happening with respect to 
precarious or poorly compensated workers.  
 
271 See Kamin et al., supra note 4, at 1442 n.5 (using “terms ‘tax games’ and ‘tax gaming’ 
to refer to both legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion, as well as to the large gray area of 
tax planning transactions that are neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal”). 
272 See id. at 1463 (discussing potential reasons for switching from employee status to 
independent contractor status while doing similar work). 
273 The regulations provide that employees who are subsequently treated as independent 
contractors will be presumed to be employees unless they can rebut such a presumption. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3). 
274 Some of the benefits of employee status may not be salient to workers. For example, 
various worker protections (including antidiscrimination protections) may not be appreciated 
until they are needed. 
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C. Summary 
This Article’s analysis has suggested a number of key takeaways. 
First, this Article has described the process by which hiring firms and workers 
decide how to structure work arrangements and classify workers as a series of 
trade-offs among direct labor and employment protections; indirect, tax-
delivered social insurance benefits; and tax consequences. Because arbitrage 
across fields is difficult, firms and workers will usually have to be consistent in 
making that trade-off. Therefore, we must take seriously any legal changes that 
tilt firm and worker choices, whether they be tax law changes or otherwise. 
Second, this Article has argued that the nature and magnitude of an 
independent contractor shift will depend on a number of variables, not just 
§ 199A. Factors such as whether the jobs in question can plausibly satisfy the 
classification tests, the risk of misclassification penalties and worker challenges, 
and IRS regulatory and enforcement choices may help limit a shift. With respect 
to § 199A itself, factors such as the statute’s complexity, its line-of-business 
limitation, and the need to pay a minimum amount of W-2 wages to employees 
may mean that certain industries or income brackets will experience less of a 
shift. The contested legal landscape outside of the tax realm matters as well; 
shifting interpretations of the various control tests may make it easier or more 
difficult for employers to classify workers as independent contractors. And there 
are other legal and economic factors that may exacerbate a workplace shift such 
that it is difficult to isolate § 199A as the primary cause. 
Third, this Article has demonstrated that the types of work and worker 
matters. For example, if a worker has a main W-2 job with solid benefits and is 
holding a part-time W-2 job or independent contractor position to buttress 
income security or to boost cash flow, we might find shifts pertaining to the part-
time work less or differently troublesome than wholesale shifts that eliminate, 
erode, or cause abandonment of the main W-2 job. For this type of worker, the 
§ 199A deduction might well act as a tax expenditure that boosts income 
security, either providing more income (if hours worked stay the same) or 
allowing more leisure time (because the worker has to work fewer hours at the 
second job). The question would then be whether boosting income security with 
this type of tax expenditure is good policy. Likewise, if a worker shifts from a 
W-2 job with solid benefits and protections to a highly skilled, well-remunerated 
independent contractor job (e.g., by becoming a self-employed sole proprietor), 
this might cause less (or at least different) concern than if the worker abandoned 
the W-2 job to do precarious work.  
In summary, any independent contractor shift caused by § 199A could have 
one of several effects: 
(1) For some workers, including current independent contractors who are 
unlikely to prevail in misclassification litigation or those already doing 
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independent contractor work as a second job, § 199A could act as an 
income subsidy.275 
(2) More specifically, to the extent that such workers are doing the 
independent contractor job to supplement income or smooth economic 
shocks or risks, § 199A could be a tax expenditure that subsidizes this 
privately constructed social safety net. 
(3) For other workers, § 199A could cause an erosion of employee 
protections and an uptick in worker precariousness by causing a 
widespread shift toward independent contractor work, either by causing 
elimination of W-2 jobs (and conversion of such jobs into independent 
contractor jobs) or by incentivizing workers to substitute independent 
contractors work for W-2 jobs. 
(4) For more sophisticated taxpayers, § 199A might lead to gaming and tax 
structuring as taxpayers choose self-employment or other pass-through 
structures rather than employee status. 
(5) Section 199A might—by subsidizing worker wages or incentivizing 
independent contractor arrangements—help domestic labor be more 
attractive than offshoring or replacing jobs with automation and might 
thereby help preserve jobs or slow job loss. 
(6) Section 199A may have no economic benefits for workers and/or lead to 
no shifts. For example, if hiring firms capture the full economic benefits 
of § 199A (e.g., by reducing wages so workers’ after-tax incomes do not 
change regardless of classification), workers may not enjoy any income 
subsidy even if they are nominally eligible for the deduction. Or, if hiring 
firms have already shifted all plausible jobs, § 199A may result in no 
further shifts. 
The empirical questions going forward—which will drive our normative 
assessment of the outcomes—are the extent to which each of these outcomes 
will occur and which ones will be most dominant. For now, current empirical 
data on workplace trends suggest that the first and second effects could be 
nontrivial and should not be discounted. 
Finally, whether § 199A will lead to a widespread independent contractor 
shift will depend on two factors: First, how valuable will workers perceive the 
§ 199A deduction to be, and how valuable will it actually be, relative to the 
benefits and protections given up? This will likely vary by job and worker. 
Second, how many existing W-2 jobs can plausibly be reclassified, given the 
shifts that have already happened? Shifting would likely require a reduction in 
control that some businesses could not tolerate, which may be especially true for 
 
275 As noted above, the size and availability of a worker’s EITC could be impacted by the 
shift from employee to independent contractor regardless of any § 199A deduction. See supra 
note 101. 
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low-wage employee work. If so, this may mean that for at least some vulnerable 
workers, the difficulty of meeting the classification tests may forestall dramatic 
workplace shifts and the accompanying loss of benefits. 
Stepping back, there are deeper questions at stake in the debate over § 199A’s 
effects: How much economic security are citizens owed? And how much of this 
security should be attached to work? There are four potential providers of 
economic security and a social safety net: employers, citizens themselves, the 
government (and within this category, state or federal), and broader society 
(including family, friends, and broader communities). 
Some of the concern regarding an independent contractor shift stems from the 
suspicion that society is moving away from a world where traditional 
employment relationships provided security to workers through a network of 
direct benefits and protections to a more precarious world in which work carries 
fewer protections and individuals are left to fend for themselves, perhaps with 
the help of friends, family, and broader communities. Although current data 
reveal that most work today remains W-2 work, there may be an increase in part-
time independent contractor work to supplement W-2 work in light of stagnant 
wages and reduced benefits. This “privatization of the social safety net” may 
reflect a shift from having an economic safety net provided by employers and/or 
the government to one based on citizens’ self-insuring through part-time 
work.276 
There have, of course, been some countervailing shifts. For example, the 
ACA, with its premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies, arguably 
represented a shift in the locus of healthcare provision from employers to the 
government.277 This type of shift might alleviate pressure on employee-
employer relationships to provide this aspect of the safety net. Along these same 
lines, the new § 199A deduction could potentially act as an indirect government 
subsidy that helps boost income or leisure consumption for some classes of 
workers. A separate but related workplace shift can be observed in proposed 
state-level initiatives to provide piecemeal protections to independent 
contractors. New York City, for example, passed legislation in August 2018 that 
allowed city regulators to set minimum pay rates for drivers.278 There have also 
 
276 See Bernhard t, supra note 232 (noting that some independent contractor work 
supplements rather than replaces W-2 jobs); Dixon, supra note 264 (reporting Bankrate 
survey that 37% of Americans have side jobs and 38% of them rely on additional income to 
fund ordinary living expenses). 
277 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122 (2018)). 
278 N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 19-549 (2018). 
  
2020] TAX LAW’S WORKPLACE SHIFT 719 
 
been initiatives in Seattle279 and California280 aimed at giving certain workers 
collective bargaining rights, regardless of their classification. Relatedly, bills 
have been proposed in New York and Washington state that would establish 
benefits frameworks for certain workers even if they are not employees.281 While 
most of these initiatives have not been enacted so far, and while the protections 
they offer are piecemeal and limited, such initiatives offer an alternative vision 
of who should be providing the economic safety net (and how much) and 
whether eligibility should depend on one’s job.  
The important point is that how one feels about § 199A, the ACA, or any of 
the recent state-level initiatives will likely depend on how one answers the 
normative question of who should provide the safety net.282 While some might 
 
279 In May 2018, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a Seattle ordinance effectively allowing 
ridesharing drivers to “unionize” was not exempt from federal antitrust law (Sherman Act) 
preemption, thus keeping the law tied up in litigation. See Chamber of Commerce v. City of 
Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that Seattle ordinance did not qualify for 
protection under state-action immunity doctrine). The court also ruled that the ordinance did 
not violate the NLRA. Id. at 790. In its ruling, the court implied that it was possible for the 
state legislature to create an ordinance that was both Sherman Act and NLRA compliant (even 
though the contested ordinance did not satisfactorily do so). See id. 
280 Reportedly, proposed California legislation was strategically withdrawn to let related 
litigation take priority (and due to concern over potential antitrust challenges). See Kate 
Conger, California Bill to Give Gig Workers Organizing Rights Stalls over Antitrust 
Concerns, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 21, 2016, 6:14 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/21 
/california-bill-to-give-gig-workers-organizing-rights-stalls-over-antitrust-concerns/ 
[https://perma.cc/VVU6-39KG] (considering whether collective bargaining rights for 
independent contractors would violate antitrust laws); see also Dubal, Winning the Battle, 
Losing the War?, supra note 5, at 744-45 (contending that California Assemblyperson Lorena 
Gonzalez was “not mov[ing] forward with [a] gig worker bill . . . because the labor 
community asked them to hold off until O’Connor went to trial”). 
281 Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Unions, Gig-Economy Firms Gear Up for New York 
Benefits Battle, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-labor-tech-
benefits/unions-gig-economy-firms-gear-up-for-new-york-benefits-battle-
idUSKBN13N0YL [https://perma.cc/5JHS-B86J] (highlighting proposed New York 
legislation targeted toward improving worker benefits by increasing portability); see Josh 
Eidelson, It’s a New Game for Uber Drivers If New York Passes This Law, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 
10, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-10/it-s-a-new-
game-for-uber-drivers-if-new-york-passes-this-law (describing upsides for Uber drivers 
resulting from New York’s proposed portable benefits legislation). For Washington state’s 
version of the legislation, see H.R. 2109, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); Maia Usui, A 
Blueprint for Progressive Federalism: Washington State’s Portable Benefits Bill, ONLABOR 
(May 17, 2017), https://onlabor.org/a-blueprint-for-progressive-federalism-washington-
states-portable-benefits-bill/ [https://perma.cc/B4CW-A9BM]. 
282 To the extent that the government provides some elements of the economic safety net, 
a secondary question is whether this should be done through the Tax Code, as both the ACA 
premium subsidies and § 199A are. Critics might well argue that even if the government 
should play a greater role in providing the safety net, this should be done directly (such as 
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rue a shift from a world in which hiring firms and traditional employer-employee 
relationships provided the bulk of economic security, others might argue that, to 
the extent that the government is playing a greater role in subsidizing healthcare 
and (possibly) secondary self-employment earnings through provisions like 
§ 199A, this might not be a bad thing in some circumstances.283 Such 
observations do not obviate criticisms of § 199A’s design. The actual statute 
could still prove distortionary, inequitable, and overly complicated despite 
reasonable underlying policies.284 
CONCLUSION 
This Article explored the relationship between tax law and decisions about 
workplace arrangements. Most pertinently, it investigated whether the 2017 tax 
reform is likely to give rise to a broad shift toward independent contractor work 
and, if such a shift does occur, how it should be normatively evaluated. We 
argued that while § 199A may create a greater tilt toward independent contractor 
classification for some workers, certain statutory features and other factors may 
help limit the shift. Still other factors may exacerbate it, such that it is difficult 
to isolate § 199A’s effects. 
We also demonstrated, drawing on empirical data on the state of the 
contemporary workplace, that even if § 199A were to prompt a shift, our 
evaluation of the shift should depend on the types of workers and work at issue. 
Different workers confront different realities. While a shift toward independent 
contractor classification may be problematic for some workers, empirical data 
suggests that for others it may be less troubling or troubling for different reasons. 
There are multiple possible dimensions to any workplace shift that might occur, 
so it is important to distinguish among different underlying policy concerns. 
This Article by no means implies that today’s workers do not face significant 
challenges. Today’s workers are confronted with stagnant wages, loss of 
organizing power, decreasing workplace benefits, and increasing inequality.285 
 
through a universal basic income or a single-payer healthcare system) rather than via an 
indirect tax expenditure. Resolving that debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
283 See Estlund, supra note 10, at 254 (arguing that separating worker entitlements from 
employment relationships might help reduce labor costs and slow replacement of jobs with 
automation and “fissuring”); cf. David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote 
Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 
TAX L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (discussing “double distortion”). 
284 See generally ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY (2018) (advocating universal basic 
income as remedy for poverty, inequality, and worker displacement by technology); Linda 
Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1 (2011) 
(challenging critiques of tax expenditures as appropriate ways to achieve certain government 
goals). 
285 See Jeff Stein & Andrew Van Dam, For the Biggest Group of American Workers, 
Wages Are Falling, WASH. POST, June 17, 2018, at A14 (discussing wages, weaker union 
rights, and distribution of growth in society). 
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Hiring firms have found other means to cut costs and limit liability, including 
by entering into cost-saving subcontracting relationships, offshoring, and 
relying on automation and technology.286 These factors have contributed to 
increasing work instability, wage inadequacy, and the need to work second jobs. 
But these types of concerns exist with respect to precarious and contingent 
employee jobs as well as independent contractor jobs. It is far from clear that an 
independent contractor shift is the factor that will lead to a huge uptick in 
contemporary worker precariousness. It is even less clear that § 199A will be a 
key driver of such a shift. 
 
286 See Eduardo Porter, The Workers Trump Forgot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2017, at B1 
(exploring rise of outsourcing); supra note 161 (explaining subcontracting). 
